Essays on the Business Cycle by Salzmann, Leonard
Essays on the Business Cycle
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors
der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät
der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel
vorgelegt von
Leonard Salzmann
aus Herrenberg
Kiel, 2020
ii
Erstbegutachtung:
Prof. Dr. Kai Carstensen
Zweitbegutachtung:
Prof. Dr. Matei Demetrescu
Drittbegutachtung:
Prof. Dr. Christian Merkl
Abgabe der Dissertationsschrift:
8. April 2020
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung:
19. August 2020
iii
To my dear grandma Inge

v
Acknowledgements
First of all, I would like to express my special gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor
and co-author Kai Carstensen. I spent eight enriching years working with Kai, rstly
at Ludwig Maximilian University Munich and then at Kiel University. His guidance and
support related to both academic and professional matters during this time were highly
valuable. In particular, I thank him for a vast number of comments and thoughts on my
research projects and his support in my job market applications. Moreover, I appreciate
his open and pleasant character that was always inspiring for new ideas.
I am also very grateful to my second supervisor Matei Demetrescu, who provided highly
valuable feedback on my research and supported me in my job market applications.
I wrote a signicant part of my dissertation during my internship at the Bank of England
in 2018, which I look back to with a lot of joy. Therefore I thank my supervisor Sinem
Hacioglu Hoke, who was very supportive in the last stage of my dissertation and my job
market process. Besides, I want to thank John, Caspar, Saleem, Mai, Kristina and Akash
for many exciting and enriching talks.
I extend my appreciation to my colleagues from ISÖ and the economics department at
Kiel University. A big thank you goes to Henning Meier. Henning, I enjoyed every minute
that we spent together, regardless of whether it was on a stormy sailing day with our boat
capsized or for a solid beer on Brick Lane. Olli, Johannes, Jan and Julian, I am pleased
to have made the best carnival adventures jointly with you - kölle alaaf! Jan and Uwe, I
will miss our coee breaks at Campus Suite!
A welcome distraction from my research work has been due to unforgettable experiences
outside of Kiel. Jan and Flo, I am very happy that we manage to see each other regularly,
despite the distance. Our meetups in Edinburgh and Tilburg are legendary, and I pledge
to always do the Carbonara if we keep them up! Seb and Dave, I hope we will have many
more skiing trips together - maybe we should take a yodeling course someday! Martina,
Markus and Christoph, thank you for the fabulous sailing trips through Denmark and
Sweden and hopefully many more to come!
I also thank my family for supporting me over the last years. Grandma, you will always
have a special place in my heart. I miss you! My very warm gratitude goes to my dear
Danielle, who unexpectedly entered my life and enriched it ever since. She sustained me
with all her strength during my dissertation, not only by bringing hot meals to my oce
just before conference deadlines but also by giving me love and care in challenging times.

vii
Contents
Acknowledgements v
List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
List of Abbreviations xiii
Introduction 1
1 The G7 Business Cycle in a Globalized World 7
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Data and detrending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 The factor structural VAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.1 Choice of the lag order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.2 The factor structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.3 Factor identication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Results of the FSVAR models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.1 Variance decompositions for the G7 sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.2 Variance decompositions for the G14 sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.3 Historical decompositions for the G14 sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4.4 Impulse response functions for the G14 sample . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5 The relevance of OIC shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5.1 Indicators of the world business cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5.2 Indicators of the national G7 business cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.6 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.8 Coauthor contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2 China's Economic Slowdown and International Ination Dynamics 49
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2 Factor-augmented vector autoregressive model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3 Data and detrending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Identication and Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5.1 Impulse response functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.5.2 Structural shock estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
viii
2.5.3 Historical decompositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.5.3.1 Ination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.5.3.2 Interest rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.5.4 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3 The Impact of Uncertainty and Financial Shocks in Recessions and Booms 73
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2 Empirical setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2.1 State-dependent FAVAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2.2 The penalty function approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2.3 Identication bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.3 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.5.1 Cross-eects of uncertainty and nancial shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.5.2 Macroeconomic impact of uncertainty shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.5.3 Macroeconomic impact of nancial shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.5.4 Impacts on sectoral employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.5.5 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A Additional Material, Chapter 1 95
A.1 Rotation of factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
A.2 Bayesian VAR Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.3 Time-varying variances of structural shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.4 Data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
B Additional Material, Chapter 2 101
B.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
C Additional Material, Chapter 3 103
C.1 Further results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
C.2 Priors and posteriors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
C.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Bibliography 111
Declaration of Authorship 117
ix
List of Figures
1.1 Detrended annualized quarterly GDP growth of the G7 and the common
component implied by the G14-FSVAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Detrended annualized quarterly GDP growth of the OIC and the common
component implied by the G14-FSVAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Historical decompositions  Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4 Historical decompositions  France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5 Historical decompositions  Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6 Historical decompositions  Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.7 Historical decompositions  Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.8 Historical decompositions  UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.9 Historical decompositions  US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.10 Historical decompositions  Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.11 Historical decompositions  Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.12 Historical decompositions  China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.13 Historical decompositions  Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.14 Historical decompositions  South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.15 Historical decompositions  South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.16 Historical decompositions  Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.17 Impulse response functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.18 Impulse response functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.19 Impulse response functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.20 Impulse response functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.21 Time-varying variances of GDP growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.22 Time-varying variances of GDP growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.1 Global ination indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2 Chinese business cycle indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3 Impulse response functions - Chinese indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4 Impulse response functions - Global price indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.5 Impulse response functions - National price indicators outside of China . . . 60
2.6 Structural shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.7 Historical decompositions - Global ination indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.8 Historical decompositions - National ination indicators outside of China . . 63
2.9 Cumulative eects of Chinese shocks on prices outside of China . . . . . . . 65
2.10 Historical decompositions - National interest rates outside of China . . . . . 67
x
3.1 Cross-eects of uncertainty and nancial shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2 Macroeconomic eects of an uncertainty shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.3 Macroeconomic eects of a nancial shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.1 Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
C.1 Macroeconomic eects of a nancial shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
C.2 Series in Yt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
xi
List of Tables
1.1 Tests of k-factor FSVAR vs. unrestricted VAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Forecast error variance decomposition based on the G7-FSVAR: Common
shocks, spillovers, and own-country shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3 Forecast error variance decomposition based on the G14-FSVAR: Common
shocks, spillovers, and own-country shocks for the G7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 Forecast error variance decomposition based on the G14-FSVAR: Common
shocks, spillovers, and own-country shocks for the OIC . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 Forecast error variance shares of global business cycle indicators accounted
for by G7 and OIC shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.6 Forecast error variance shares of G7 business cycle indicators accounted for
by OIC shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.7 Forecast error variance decompositions: Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.1 Number of factors selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.2 Cumulative eects of Chinese shocks on prices outside of China . . . . . . . 66
2.3 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.1 Forecast error variance decomposition - Uncertainty shock . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2 Forecast error variance decomposition - Financial shock . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.3 Forecast error variance decomposition - Sectoral employment growth . . . . 90
3.4 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A.1 Data sources for real GDP and population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
A.2 Data sources: National macro indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
C.1 Forecast error variance decomposition - Financial shock . . . . . . . . . . . 103
C.2 Series in Xt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
C.2 Series in Xt ctd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

xiii
List of Abbreviations
AD Aggregate demand
AIC Akaike information criterion
AS Aggregate supply
BBD Bloom, Baker, and Davis (2016)
CPI Consumer price index
DS Datastream
EBP Excess bond premium
FAVAR Factor-augmented vector autoregressive (model)
FFR Federal funds rate
(F)GLS (Feasible) generalized least squares
FSVAR Factor structural vector autoregressive (model)
HQ Hannan Quinn (criterion)
IRF Impulse response function
JLN Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015)
LR Likelihood ratio
ML Maximum likelihood
NBER National Bureau of Economic Research
OIC Other industrialized countries
OLS Ordinary least squares
PFA Penalty function approach
PPI Producer price index
SIC Schwarz information criterion
VAR Vector autoregressive (model)

1
Introduction
Business cycle analysis has a long tradition in macroeconomics. A variety of models and
methods have been used traditionally for investigating the sources and eects of economic
uctuations.
The research agenda has undergone a continuous change over time. To give an ex-
ample, the unprecedented disruptions of the Great Recession have cast doubt on whether
traditional tools for explaining business cycle uctuations like RBC models suce in times
of turmoil. Hence, the literature has increasingly focused on alternative sources, such as
economic uncertainty. According to theory, higher uncertainty has implications for real
activity since entrepreneurs defer capital investments and risk premia on external nance
rise (Bloom, 2009; Christiano et al., 2014). The empirical relevance of these mechanisms
has been examined extensively. Stock and Watson (2012) and Caldara et al. (2016), for ex-
ample, show that the shocks that produced the Great Recession primarily were associated
with heightened uncertainty and nancial disruptions.
As globalization proceeds, the international connectedness of national economies has
also come to the fore of economic research. Kose et al. (2012), for instance, found evidence
for the proposition that trade and nancial market integration has enhanced the business
cycle synchronization among industrial countries and emerging economies. Besides, newly
industrialized countries like China play a steadily growing role in global business cycle and
ination dynamics. Aastveit et al. (2015) show that the demand from emerging economies
has become twice as important as the demand from developed countries in accounting
for the uctuations in oil prices, and these uctuations also spill over to national price
indicators in the advanced economies (Eickmeier and Kühnlenz, 2016).
In my dissertation, I empirically address questions related to these research elds.
I contribute to understanding business cycle uctuations and ination dynamics within
the advanced economies and international linkages between these. Moreover, I provide
new and policy-relevant evidence on two notable economic events of the last two decades,
namely the Great Recession and the downturn in global ination rates hereafter. The
empirical frameworks I use are based on medium to large-dimensional multivariate time
series analysis with a focus on factor analysis. In addition, I partially allow for nonlinearity
by distinguishing between discrete model regimes. The estimation methodologies rest upon
state-of-the-art Bayesian and frequentist techniques.
The dissertation consists of three essays. The rst essay is coauthored with my
supervisor Kai Carstensen and has been published in a peer-reviewed journal. The two
following essays are both single-authored and published as working papers. In 2018 the
second essay was awarded by the Research Prize of the INFER network. I plan to publish
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both my single-authored essays in high-ranked journals.
Chapter one comprises the rst essay The G7 Business Cycle in a Globalized
World , which is joint work with Kai Carstensen. My coauthor and I herein address the
empirical relevance of business cycle shocks originating in the newly industrialized non-G7
countries for the G7 business cycle. We t a factor structural VAR (FSVAR) model to
quarterly GDP growth of 14 countries out of the G20 group and identify three common
international factors, one of which represents the commonalities orthogonal to the G7.
Besides, we model network eects of idiosyncratic changes in national GDP growth rates
by allowing for 14 country-specic shocks that can aect other countries after one quarter.
We document that the non-G7 factor and the idiosyncratic non-G7 shocks, thus output
innovations originating outside the G7, jointly account for shares of 10 to almost 25 percent
in the forecast error variance of G7 GDP growth rates. Moreover, we nd that these
innovations are relevant, relative to G7 output innovations, in the uctuations of other key
national G7 indicators such as employment, the current account balance, ination, and
ination volatility, and in global macroeconomic variables like the oil price, world stock
market returns and exchange rate volatility. We published this essay in 2017 in the Journal
of International Money and Finance.
Chapter two comprises my rst single-authored essay China's Economic Slowdown
and International Ination Dynamics , which addresses the impact of the downturn
in the Chinese business cycle during the last decade on ination rates outside of China.
The essay is motivated by empirical results indicating a signicant Chinese inuence on
international commodity prices (e.g., Eickmeier and Kühnlenz, 2016) and a co-movement
between the cyclical trend in China and global ination rates after the Great Recession.
My empirical framework is a large-dimensional factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) model
that includes 749 international macro series plus the Chinese GDP growth rate and the
Chinese ination rate as observable variables. To identify aggregate demand and supply
shocks in China, I impose sign restrictions on the impulse response prole of the two
Chinese variables.
The results show that these shocks have international implications. Demand innova-
tions in China signicantly increase national ination rates in the advanced economies,
particularly transmitted by global oil and commodity prices. The impacts are most pro-
nounced in the United States and are reected more in terms of producer prices than
consumer prices. Moreover, historical decompositions indicate that the cyclical downturn
in China can be attributed to a combination of adverse domestic supply and demand inno-
vations, and that these innovations lowered national producer prices outside of China by
up to six percent between 2014 and 2017. Finally, the Chinese shocks are also reected in
foreign interest rates, as implied by the Fisher eect and monetary policy rules.
Chapter three comprises my second single-authored essay The Macroeconomic Im-
pact of Uncertainty and Financial Shocks in Recessions and Booms . The essay
is motivated by the diculty of isolating uncertainty and nancial shocks from each other,
resulting in a disagreement in the literature on their macroeconomic impact. To obtain
a more complete picture, I compute identication bounds instead of point estimates of
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the eect of both shocks in a state-dependent FAVAR model for the United States. The
bounds are constructed by employing a version of the penalty function approach proposed
by Uhlig (2005) and Caldara et al. (2016).
The results show that adverse uncertainty shocks are of limited relevance for business
cycle indicators in booms but have contractionary eects in recessions. By contrast, ad-
verse nancial shocks reduce real activity and asset prices in both regimes. The role of
identifying assumptions also diers between both shocks. Financial disturbances exhibit
relatively tight identication bounds considering the impact on stock and house prices,
which conrms them as driving forces of asset price uctuations. By contrast, the spectrum
of possible eects from uncertainty shocks is relatively broad, ranging between signicant
and negligible in terms of asset prices. If we look at real economic activity, the eects
of both shocks are hard to pin down since they considerably vary across identication
schemes.
How do the essays relate to each other? Each essay of this dissertation asks
specic research questions and uses tailored econometric methods. However, the essays
also share several features, both methodologically and content-related.
Overall, all three of them address sources and transmission mechanisms of business
cycle uctuations in the globalization era. The essays in Chapters I and II both address
the international connectedness of the global economy and set a focus on the role of the
newly industrialized countries. Chapter I does so by looking at the reaction of the G7
business cycle to shocks originating outside the G7 group and the transmission of these
shocks. Chapter II zooms into the prominent role of the Chinese economy within the non-
G7 group and focuses on two signicant events of the last decade, namely the slowdown
in China's economic performance and the worldwide decline in ination and interest rates.
Chapter III diers from chapters I and II in that it focuses on the domestic business cycle.
All three essays build on multivariate time series methods and, in particular, factor
analysis. Whereas the essay in chapter I employs the factor structural VAR model, the
essays in chapters II and III apply the factor-augmented VAR approach. Both model
frameworks assume that a panel of macroeconomic time series can be decomposed into a
common and an idiosyncratic, i.e., series-specic part. In the FAVAR, a typically large
number of time series is reduced to a handful of common factors, which are then added
to an otherwise standard VAR. As a result, the FAVAR allows the dynamic analysis of
large panels even if the number of time observations is limited. In addition, if the cross-
section n is large relative to the time dimension T , the estimation uncertainty related to
the factors becomes negligible (Bai, Ng, et al., 2006). Hence, the curse of dimensionality
in multivariate analysis turns into a blessing in this case. In the FSVAR, by contrast, the
factor structure is imposed on the reduced-form VAR residuals and not on the time series
themselves. On the one hand, this setup implies the need of keeping n moderate. On the
other hand, it allows for dynamic spillovers from idiosyncratic shocks to other series. In a
multi-country VAR, for instance, national indicators can react to a common international
shock and an idiosyncratic domestic shock, but also to idiosyncratic foreign shocks.
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How do the essays contribute to the literature? Each of the three essays con-
tributes to the business cycle literature by providing new empirical evidence on specic
research questions. In brief, the contributions are in terms of the data foundation, the
empirical methodology, and the identication setup. Concerning the data, I use large
cross-sections of countries and economic indicators and time windows that include major
economic events like the Great Recession. Methodologically, I examine the empirical rel-
evance of network eects in the international business cycle and the state dependence of
macroeconomic shocks. In terms of identication, my ndings indicate to which degree
macroeconomic shocks can be empirically isolated. The contributions are outlined in more
detail in the following.
Chapter I adds to the literature on the newly industrialized economies and their role
for the business cycles of the advanced economies, a topic on which the empirical evi-
dence is generally scant. My coauthor and I depart from the narrative that regional and
group-specic factors appear to drive the business cycle uctuations of national economies
(Crespo-Cuaresma and Fernández-Amador, 2013; Helbling and Bayoumi, 2003; Kose et
al., 2012; Stock and Watson, 2005). This narrative is in part model and not data-based
since it rests upon modeling commonalities among country groups and neglects eects
between countries of dierent groups. The framework we use is more exible in this re-
gard since it allows for common factors but additionally accounts for spillovers between
individual countries. Hence, it is informative for typical multicountry DSGE models fea-
turing country-specic structural shocks that propagate through both national and foreign
economies.
Our results indicate that regional and group-specic clustering cannot explain all as-
pects of business cycle uctuations in the industrialized countries. Idiosyncratic shocks
from non-G7 countries play a non-negligible role for important G7 indicators and should
therefore be considered in macroeconomic modeling and forecasting. We moreover nd
that the indicators aected most by shocks from non-G7 countries are employment, ina-
tion, interest rates, the current account balance, exchange rates, and world market prices
for oil and manufacturing goods.
Chapter II contributes to understanding the worldwide downturn in ination rates that
took place during the last decade by examining the role of the Chinese business cycle. The
existing evidence on this issue is either restricted to China's neighboring countries in Asia
(Dizioli et al., 2016) or based on theoretical slowdown scenarios instead of economic data
(Metelli and Natoli, 2017). I use a large-scale FAVAR model that allows analyzing the
Chinese inuence on dierent world regions while controlling for international business
cycle movements. The nding that adverse Chinese shocks signicantly reduced global
oil prices and national prices outside of China between 2014 and 2017 emphasizes foreign
business cycle shocks relative to domestic and oil market shocks (Ciccarelli et al., 2017;
Bobeica et al., 2017; Baumeister and Kilian, 2016) as driving forces of ination rates. In
particular, it shows that business cycle spillovers from China have become important for
price dynamics, both at the national and global level. The spillover eects on interest rates
show that Chinese shocks are also relevant for nancial indicators worldwide and hence
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should be considered in the current debate on low yields. As a result, shocks originating in
China should be taken into account in modeling ination and interest rates in the advanced
economies, also and foremost from a monetary policy maker's perspective.
The main contributions of Chapter III relate to the identication bounds and the
state-dependence of uncertainty and nancial shocks. First, nancial shocks tend to ex-
hibit tighter bounds than uncertainty shocks, hence their macroeconomic impact can be
determined more precisely. By contrast, it is generally dicult to pin down the impact of
uncertainty shocks since identifying assumptions on the shocks are crucial. These ndings
strengthen the view that uncertainty shocks are potentially less relevant if nancial shocks
are simultaneously accounted for. Second, the identication bounds unite views stressing
the role of uncertainty as source of business cycle uctuations (Bloom, 2009; Bachmann
et al., 2013; Alessandri and Mumtaz, 2018; Christiano et al., 2014) with conservative views
(Ludvigson et al., 2015; Popescu and Smets, 2010) in one framework. They accordingly
also represent dierent implicit transmission mechanisms: while uncertainty shocks have
real eects through a worsening in credit conditions, the contractionary impact of nancial
shocks is explained by a rise in uncertainty. Third, the distinction between a recession and
a boom regime accounts for the special role of nancial and uncertainty shocks during the
Great Recession (Stock and Watson, 2012; Caldara et al., 2016). My results show that
the macroeconomic impact of both shocks is more pronounced in recessions, albeit with a
greater importance of identifying assumptions.
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapters 1 to 3 include the
three essays described above. At the end of chapter 1, the contribution of my co-author
to our joint essay is outlined. Appendices A to C present additional tables and gures
and explanations on the methodological approaches the individual essays refer to. The
document ends with a list of bibliographic references and a declaration to conrm that the
dissertation has been developed independently.
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Chapter 1
The G7 Business Cycle in a
Globalized World
This chapter of the dissertation has been published as Carstensen, K. and Salzmann, L.
(2017), The G7 Business Cycle in a Globalized World, Journal of International Money and
Finance (73), 134-161.
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Abstract
Using a factor structural VAR for 14 countries out of the G20 group, we document that
output innovations originating outside the G7 account for shares of 10 to almost 25 per-
cent in the business cycle uctuations of G7 GDP growth. Using auxiliary regressions,
we additionally nd that these innovations contribute noticeably, relative to G7 output
innovations, to short-term uctuations in important other national G7 variables such as
employment, the current account balance, ination, and ination volatility, and in global
macroeconomic indicators like the oil price, world stock market returns and exchange rate
volatility. The results indicate that in a globalized world spillovers from emerging markets
and industrial countries other than the G7 play a relevant role for major aspects of the G7
and world business cycle.
Keywords: G7, international business cycle transmission, factor structural VAR.
JEL classication: E32, F44, F62
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1.1 Introduction
In this paper, we assess the relevance of output innovations originating outside the G7 for
the world and the national G7 business cycles, a question that has become more and more
important as globalization proceeds. We t a factor structural VAR (FSVAR) model to
quarterly GDP growth of all 14 countries out of the G20 group for which long time series
are available. We identify three common international factors, one of which represents
the commonalities orthogonal to the G7, and 14 country-specic shocks which reect the
idiosyncratic changes in national GDP growth rates but are allowed to spill over to other
countries with a lag of one quarter. With the help of forecast error variance decompositions
we document that the non-G7 factor and the idiosyncratic non-G7 shocks, hence output
innovations originating outside the G7, jointly account for shares of 10 to almost 25 percent
in the business cycle uctuations of G7 GDP growth rates.
Subsequently, we regress indicators for the world business cycle and the national G7
business cycles on the international factors and country-specic shocks extracted by the
FSVAR model. We break the R-squared of these regressions down into a part that is due
to the G7 and a part that is due to the remaining countries. Since the factors and shocks
are mutually uncorrelated, this procedure can be interpreted as a forecast error variance
decomposition without the need to estimate and invert additional VAR models.
We document that the relative importance of output innovations originating outside
the G7 for global uctuations pertains mostly to ination and exchange rate volatility and
to nominal variables like global stock market returns and world market prices for oil and
manufacturing goods, whereas indicators of real activity like GDP of the OECD, world
industrial production and world trade are aected moderately. On the national G7 level,
non-G7 output innovations contribute substantially, relative to G7 innovations, to the
uctuations in relevant business cycle indicators such as employment and unemployment,
the current account balance and the eective exchange rate, ination, interest rates and
stock market returns, and in ination, stock market and exchange rate volatility. Taken
together, our ndings indicate that business cycle uctuations spill over from non-G7 to G7
countries in a quantitatively signicant way and that this spillover is associated particularly
with world market returns and prices, and their volatilities.
This paper is most closely related to Stock and Watson (2005) who use the same FSVAR
setup to analyze the business cycle synchronization of the G7 in the Great Moderation
period 1984-2002 as opposed to the more volatile period 1960-1983. We consider the
time period 1991-2014 which allows us to augment the country set with Australia, Brazil,
China, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey and examine how these countries
aect the G7 business cycle. Still, our results show that many of their ndings for the Great
Moderation period remain remarkably intact. In particular, we also nd that G7 output
growth is driven by two G7-factors of which one factor mainly aects euro area countries
and the other one is rather associated with English-speaking countries. The third factor
we identify is orthogonal to the G7 and may thus be labeled a non-G7 factor.
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The latter result replicates an empirical pattern often found in the literature on in-
ternational macroeconomic uctuations during the globalization era: regional and group-
specic factors rather than a single dominating world factor appear to drive the business
cycle uctuations of individual countries. Artis and Zhang (1997), Artis and Zhang (1999),
Del Negro and Otrok (2003), Luginbuhl and Koopman (2004), and Crespo-Cuaresma and
Fernández-Amador (2013) report a continental-European cluster consisting of Germany,
France and Italy, while Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) and Stock and Watson (2005) pro-
vide evidence for an English-speaking cluster consisting of the US, UK and Canada. For a
larger country group Mumtaz et al. (2011) and Hirata et al. (2013) nd that the inuence
of a global common component has decreased during the post-WWII era while the contri-
bution of geographic inuences has increased. Similarly, Kose et al. (2012) report that the
global factor has become less important for macroeconomic uctuations relative to factors
that are specic to industrial countries and emerging markets, respectively.
However, unlike most of the recent literature, we nd that business cycle clustering
is not the complete story: spillovers play a non-negligible role and should be taken into
account both in macroeconomic modeling and in forecasting. We are able to obtain this
results because we depart methodologically from related work by Kose et al. (2012), Mum-
taz et al. (2011), Eickmeier (2007), Kose et al. (2003) and Crucini et al. (2011) who apply
(dynamic) factor models to study international business cycle transmission. These mod-
els focus on the dynamics of the common components and shut down spillovers from one
country to another which allows them to include huge numbers of variables. While this is
certainly an advantage, Diebold and Yilmaz (2013) report that spillover eects of idiosyn-
cratic shocks to foreign countries are important. For example, we may expect that a US
monetary policy shock aects, at least with a lag, business conditions in other countries.
In a dynamic factor model this shock would presumably be classied partly as global shock
and partly as an idiosyncratic shock without international eects. In contrast, the FSVAR
model allows to simultaneously identify common international factors and country-specic
shocks by assuming that the latter spill over to internationally with a lag of one period.
Nevertheless, it remains estimable for a sample of 14 countries.
We favor the FSVAR over the dynamic factor model also for another reason. Empirical
research intends to isolate stylized empirical facts that are widely accepted and guide
theorists in setting up and calibrating structural models. Typical multi-country DSGE
models feature country-specic structural shocks that propagate through both national
and foreign economies. To be informative for these models, we prefer to use an empirical
model like the FSVAR that allows for such international transmission.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the data and outlines the
detrending procedure. Section 1.3 introduces the FSVAR and describes how we identify
the common international factors. Section 1.4 presents the results of the FSVAR. In
section 1.5, we report the results of supplementary regressions of world and G7 business
cycle indicators on the factors and shocks extracted by the FSVAR. In section 1.6, we
check the robustness of our main ndings to specication change. Section 1.7 concludes.
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1.2 Data and detrending
We use seasonally adjusted quarterly per capita GDP covering the period 1991Q1-2014Q4.
We include all countries out of the G20 group for which data are available: The G7
and seven further industrialized countries, namely Australia, Brazil, China, Mexico, South
Africa, South Korea, and Turkey. In the following we refer to the non-G7 group of countries
as Other industrialized countries (OIC) and to the entire country set as G14.
We consider GDP rather than industrial production  another often-used indicator 
as it may be better suited to reect the overall business cycle situation of countries that
generate large and increasing fractions of their value added in the service sector. In fact,
the average share of industrial production in GDP over the last decade ranged only between
27% (Brazil) and 46% (China) in the OIC countries, and between 20% (France) and 30%
(Germany) in the G7 countries, and was generally decreasing1.
We choose a quarterly frequency because it is widely accepted as the usual business
cycle frequency. Moreover, imposing zero restrictions on the VAR impact matrix to identify
structural shocks  a strategy we use below  is much less controversial when using quarterly
rather than annual data. Specically, we will identify a national business cycle shock by
restricting its within-quarter eect on all other countries to zero. It would be much more
dicult to argue that, e.g., a national US shock does not spill over to, say, Mexico, China,
or Europe within one year.
We exclude those countries of the G20 for which no quarterly data over the whole
period exist. Cutting down the sample size to 1996Q2 to include all G20 countries would
not only mechanically reduce the number of observations, it would also mean to neglect
some important business cycle movements like the euro area trough of 1993. We show in
the robustness analysis in section 1.6 that our conclusions remain almost unchanged if we
include all G20 countries (except for the EU) and start our estimation in 1996Q2.
To obtain a clean measure of the business cycle, we rst adjust GDP by the population
number, thereby taking out any population trend. The resulting GDP per capita is then
turned into annualized growth rates. In three instances, we observe extremely large abso-
lute growth rates. To prevent our results from being driven by these outliers, we trim any
growth rate that is further than ve times the interquartile range away from its median
to the respective threshold. We show in the robustness analysis in section 1.6 that this
adjustment scheme does not drive our results.
To account for the possibility that GDP per capita growth does not uctuate around
a constant mean but, e.g., exhibits a secular productivity trend, we apply the local-level
model suggested by Stock and Watson (2005):
yt = µt + ut (1.1)
µt = µt−1 + τηt (1.2)
ut =
4∑
i=1
αiut−i + wt (1.3)
1These shares are based on the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank.
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where ηt and wt are serially and mutually uncorrelated mean-zero disturbances. The
measurement equation (1.1) decomposes GDP growth, yt, into a slowly evolving mean, µt,
and a stationary cycle, ut. According to (1.2) µt follows a random walk, while (1.3) models
ut as an AR(4) process. The relative importance of the trend innovations, ηt, compared to
the cyclical shocks, wt, is reected by the scaling factor τ .
We estimate the local level model using an asymptotically median unbiased estimator
of τ as proposed by Stock and Watson (1998). It is based on inversion of a point-optimal
invariant test of the null hypothesis τ = 0 against the local alternative τ = 7/T . Specif-
ically, after extracting the AR(4) component from each GDP growth series, we compute
the median unbiased estimator of τ . Then we use the Kalman smoother to remove µt.
This yields detrended GDP growth as shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Anticipating the sub-
sequent results, the gures include the common component extracted from a three-factor
G14 structural VAR. It demonstrates that there is a strong degree of international business
cycle synchronization.
Figure 1.1: Detrended annualized quarterly GDP growth of the G7 and
the common component implied by the G14-FSVAR
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Figure 1.2: Detrended annualized quarterly GDP growth of the OIC and
the common component implied by the G14-FSVAR
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1.3 The factor structural VAR
To examine international business cycle synchronization, we use a structural VAR model
with a factor structure in the disturbances. This allows us to separate common interna-
tional factors from idiosyncratic national shocks. In this section, we describe the speci-
cation of the model and the assumptions imposed to identify the shocks.
1.3.1 Choice of the lag order
We start from the unrestricted VAR model
Yt =
p∑
i=1
AiYt−i + vt, E(vtv
′
t) = Σ, (1.4)
where Yt is a n-dimensional vector of detrended GDP growth rates, vt is a vector of reduced-
from shocks and Ai denotes a coecient matrix. A major drawback of this model is the
curse of dimensionality: the number of coecients to be estimated increases quadratically
with the number of variables. Including n = 14 countries and p = 4 lags  a natural choice
for quarterly data  would almost exhaust the available degrees of freedom. Therefore,
we impose zero restrictions on the coecient matrices. Specically, while we allow a lag
order of p = 4, we restrict the o-diagonal elements of A2 to A4 to zero. This implies
that distributed lag eects beyond one quarter work through retarded reactions of GDP
to its own past only. Stock and Watson (2005) nd this dynamics to be rich enough to
characterize business cycle transmission among the G72.
To account for the coecient restrictions we estimate the parameter matrices Ai by
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). In the rst step, we estimate the model equa-
tionwise by OLS and calculate the covariance matrix of the residuals. In the second step,
we estimate the VAR as a system, plugging the estimated covariance matrix into the FGLS
estimator.
1.3.2 The factor structure
To isolate an international cycle from remaining idiosyncratic, i.e., country-specic, com-
ponents, we follow Stock and Watson (2005) and impose an (exact) factor structure on the
reduced-form shocks vt. Thereby we decompose each of them into k common factors ft
and one idiosyncratic component:
vt = Γft + ξt, (1.5)
where ξt denotes the n-dimensional vector of country-specic shocks, ft denotes the k-
dimensional vector of factors, and Γ is a (n×k) matrix of factor loadings. We assume that
both ft and ξt are uncorrelated with each other and over time, with diagonal covariance
2In a robustness analysis in section 1.6 below, we demonstrate that our benchmark results are robust to
dierent lag order specications. We specied both a lag order of p = 1 as selected by information criteria
and an unrestricted FSVAR with p = 4 which we estimate by Bayesian methods and a Minnesota-style
prior. Both specication choices do not signicantly alter our results.
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matrices Σf = I and Σξ. Hence, the variance structure is
Σ = ΓΣfΓ
′ + Σξ. (1.6)
We estimate the decomposition of the reduced form covariance matrix Σ into the factor
structure (1.6) by means of Gaussian maximum likelihood.
The covariance structure implies that any cross-correlation of the reduced form distur-
bance is due to the common factors and thus identies the factor space. Correspondingly,
a factor aects GDP of all countries jointly and instantaneously, while a country-specic
shock spills over to other countries only after at least one quarter. Hence, all we require is
that idiosyncratic GDP shocks hitting one country need more than 3 months to transmit
to another country's GDP. In our view, this assumption is not overly restrictive as even
within a country, it typically takes longer than 3 months that a structural shock aects
GDP signicantly, see, e.g., Bernanke and Mihov (1998) for monetary policy shocks, and
Romer and Romer (2010) for scal policy shocks.
A similar factor structure is used by Altonji and Ham (1990), Norrbin and Schlagenhauf
(1996), and Stock and Watson (2005). Its main advantage is that it allows all shocks to
aect all variables. This turns out to be important empirically because, as we will document
below, lagged international spillovers of country-specic shocks explain relevant fractions
of the business cycle uctuations in other countries' GDP. In contrast, (dynamic) factor
models of the type studied by Eickmeier (2007), Kose et al. (2003), and Crucini et al. (2011)
model only the dynamics of the common component. While this allows them to include
huge numbers of variables  Eickmeier (2007) considers 264 , they shut down spillovers
from one country to another and thereby neglect an important channel of international
business cycle transmission.
The number of factors, k, is determined by a likelihood ratio test (see Table 1.1). We
rst consider a VAR model that includes the G7 countries only. The null hypothesis of
one factor is clearly rejected against the alternative of an unrestricted VAR, while the null
of two factors cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level. Hence, we allow for two factors
in the G7 model, a result that is in line with the ndings of Stock and Watson (2005) and
Helbling and Bayoumi (2003)3. Next we include all G14 countries into the VAR model. At
the 5 percent level, the test indicates the presence of three factors. Thus, adding the OIC
countries to the G7 countries requires to increase the factor space by one dimension. This
already suggests that the G14 sample may give new insights compared to the G7 sample
often analyzed in the literature.
1.3.3 Factor identication
Based on our nding of two factors for the G7 sample and three factors for the G14 sample,
we pursue the following identication scheme. In the rst stage, we t the FSVAR model
to the G7 sample (G7-FSVAR) allowing for two factors which we denote by fG7t . We
identify these two factors by means of a restriction imposed on the loading matrix Γ.
3Stock and Watson (2005) and Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) use G7 output data for the time periods
1960-2002 and 1973-2001, respectively.
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Table 1.1: Tests of k-factor FSVAR vs. unrestricted VAR
G7-FSVAR G14-FSVAR
Number of factors k d.f. LR statistic p-value d.f. LR statistic p-value
1 14 29.29 0.01 77 131.68 0.00
2 8 12.41 0.13 64 89.71 0.02
3 3 1.23 0.74 52 69.29 0.05
Notes: The likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic and the p-values are with respect to the null hypothesis that
the VAR error covariance matrix has a k factor structure against the alternative that it is unrestricted.
Specically, we restrict the loading coecient of the second factor on US GDP to zero
as proposed by Stock and Watson (2005). Similar to their ndings, it turns out that the
rst factor represents a cluster of the three English-speaking countries Canada, UK, and
US with particular relevance for the US (US factor), while the second factor reects the
commonalities of the euro area countries France, Germany, and Italy (euro factor).
In the second stage, we estimate the FSVAR model for the G14 sample (G14-FSVAR)
allowing for three factors which we denote by fG14t . Our aim is to interpret the rst two
factors as comparable US and euro factors and the third one as an OIC factor, i.e., as
a factor that reects the additional commonalities of the OIC countries. To this end, we
apply a factor rotation that maximizes the correlation of the rst G14 factor, fG141t , with
the rst G7 factor, fG71t , and the correlation of the second G14 factor, f
G14
2t , with the
second G7 factor, fG72t . A description of the rotation scheme is provided in section A.1.
This rotation also identies the third factor because it is assumed to be orthogonal to the
rst two. Eectively, the third factor is merely uncorrelated to the two factors extracted
from the G7 sample which suggest to interpret it as OIC factor.
To identify the three factors as US, euro, and OIC factors, we could also use zero
restrictions on the loading matrix. We show in the robustness analysis in section 1.6 that
such an approach yields very similar results.
1.4 Results of the FSVAR models
In this section we present forecast error variance decompositions and historical decom-
positions for the FSVAR models of the G7 and G14 samples estimated over the period
1991Q1-2014Q4. The aim is to assess the quantitative importance of the common factors
and idiosyncratic shocks for the national business cycles. We place particular emphasis on
the question whether shocks originating in the OIC aect the G7 to any relevant extent.
In order to fully appreciate the G14 results, we also show the impulse responses to each of
the factors.
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1.4.1 Variance decompositions for the G7 sample
In the rst stage of our estimation procedure, we estimate the two-factor G7-FSVAR which
is exclusively based on the G7 sample. Thereby, the results are directly comparable to the
literature that focuses on the G7.
Table 1.2 reports for GDP growth of each country i the forecast error variance shares
accounted for by each of the common factors, by the idiosyncratic shock i of this country
(own shock), and by the sum of all other idiosyncratic shocks which spill over from other
countries (spillovers). As a general result, we nd that short-term uctuations (h = 1
and h = 2) are strongly driven by own shocks while spillovers are more relevant at business
cycle frequencies (h = 4 and h = 8). A notable exception is the UK for which own shocks
consistently account for more than 70 percent of the variance while spillovers are negligible
at all horizons.
The two factors are relevant at all horizons, but particularly so at business cycle fre-
quencies. The rst factor aects all G7 countries. It accounts for more than 60 percent
of the variance in US GDP growth at all horizons, which is why we label it a US factor.
At horizons 4 and 8 it is also very important for Canada. For the UK it is less relevant
but still explains the largest variance share that is not accounted for by the own shock
of the UK. This suggests that the US factor represents a kind of business cycle cluster
of the English-speaking countries which is in line with Helbling and Bayoumi (2003) and
Stock and Watson (2005) who also report that one of the two factors that describe the G7
business cycle is particularly related to the US, Canada, and the UK.
The second factor is barely relevant for the US and Canada, and it explains only
moderate fractions of the variance in GDP growth of Japan and the UK. Instead, it is
highly important for uctuations in GDP growth of the three euro area countries France,
Germany, and Italy, both in the short-term and at business cycle frequencies. This pattern
suggests that a euro area business cycle has emerged. Therefore, we label the second factor
a euro factor. Again these ndings are in line with the literature. Stock and Watson (2005)
provide evidence of a euro zone factor from the mid-eighties on. In addition, there is a
bulk of empirical papers documenting cyclical characteristics which are specic to the euro
area as compared to global comovements, e.g., Artis and Zhang (1997), Artis and Zhang
(1999), Del Negro and Otrok (2003), Luginbuhl and Koopman (2004), Crespo-Cuaresma
and Fernández-Amador (2013).
1.4.2 Variance decompositions for the G14 sample
In the second stage of our estimation procedure, we estimate the three-factor G14-FSVAR.
It is based on the full G14 sample with the rst two factors being rotated such that they
are as strongly correlated as possible with the two factors extracted from the G7 sample.
As we are particularly interested in the role of the OIC for the G7 business cycle, we now
separately report total spillovers from the G7 and total spillovers from the OIC.
Table 1.3 shows the variance decompositions for the G7. We nd that the rst factor is
again the most important factor for the US, Canada, and the UK, whereas the second factor
is quantitatively relevant mainly for France, Germany, and Italy. Hence, nding a cluster
18 Chapter 1. The G7 Business Cycle in a Globalized World
Table 1.2: Forecast error variance decomposition based on the G7-FSVAR:
Common shocks, spillovers, and own-country shocks
Country h Forecast
error
s.d.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Spillovers Own shock
Canada
1 1.49 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.86
2 1.38 0.28 0.06 0.04 0.62
4 1.29 0.40 0.12 0.16 0.33
8 1.10 0.40 0.11 0.31 0.18
France
1 1.39 0.11 0.51 0.00 0.39
2 1.26 0.19 0.49 0.03 0.29
4 1.17 0.27 0.46 0.07 0.20
8 1.01 0.31 0.40 0.15 0.14
Germany
1 2.54 0.03 0.36 0.00 0.61
2 2.15 0.10 0.52 0.06 0.32
4 1.87 0.18 0.56 0.11 0.16
8 1.58 0.24 0.52 0.16 0.08
Italy
1 2.01 0.02 0.62 0.00 0.36
2 1.85 0.06 0.64 0.01 0.29
4 1.64 0.11 0.61 0.05 0.23
8 1.31 0.15 0.53 0.13 0.18
Japan
1 3.55 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.82
2 2.89 0.08 0.19 0.06 0.67
4 2.22 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.58
8 1.49 0.14 0.20 0.14 0.52
UK
1 1.65 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.74
2 1.61 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.70
4 1.62 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.70
8 1.47 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.73
US
1 1.85 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.06
2 1.55 0.86 0.01 0.09 0.04
4 1.45 0.73 0.02 0.22 0.03
8 1.27 0.62 0.02 0.33 0.02
Notes: The table shows the square root of the forecast error variance of detrended GDP growth and its
decomposition into factors, spillovers, and own shocks. The results are based on the two-factor G7-FSVAR.
The standard deviations are in percentage points at an annual level, i.e. 400/h times the forecast error
where h is the forecast horizon.
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of English-speaking countries and a cluster of euro area countries is robust to the inclusion
of more countries into the sample. However, increasing the set of countries produces also
a notable dierence: The rst factor loses some of its relevance for the US business cycle
(mainly due to the inclusion of Mexico). Using the G14 sample it is estimated to account
for 59 percent of the short-term uctuations in US GDP, while using the G7 sample it
was found to account for 94 percent which is not very plausible. Including more countries
appears to help distinguishing between international factors and country-specic shocks.
The third factor has a small share in the forecast error variance of the G7. This
in line with the LR test which indicated that two factors are sucient to describe the
commonalities of the G7. However, it does not mean that business cycle uctuations
originating in the OIC are irrelevant for the G7. In fact, at business cycle frequencies of
h = 4 and h = 8, spillovers from the OIC are approximately as important as spillovers from
other G7 countries and aect particularly Germany, Italy, and Japan which are countries
that export relatively large shares of their GDP to the OIC. For these countries a portion of
up to 17, 22, and 19 percent is attributed to idiosyncratic shocks in the OIC, respectively.
The total eect of the OIC on the G7 countries dened as the sum of the variance shares
explained by the third factor and the spillovers from the OIC, is even higher. It ranges
between 10 and 23 percent at the horizon of eight quarters.
Own shocks are mainly responsible for uctuations in the short-term and much less at
business cycle frequencies. For Italy and France, they are even of moderate relevance at
the one quarter horizon. This nding is in line with the result of Crucini et al. (2011) that
France and Italy are the most integrated countries out of the G7 group.
Table 1.4 shows the variance decompositions for the OIC. Similar to Kose et al. (2012),
we nd that the share of idiosyncratic shocks is larger in the OIC than in the G7. With the
exception of Brazil and Mexico own shocks account for more than 50 percent of the error
variance, even at business cycle frequencies. This nding may partly be a consequence of
national crises (Efecto tequila, Asian crisis) that took place during the 1990s. Neverthe-
less, international factors and spillovers turn out to be relevant. Not surprisingly, the US
factor aects mainly Mexico and, to some extent, the Asian countries. The euro factor
appears to have some explanatory power for Turkey and China, and particularly Brazil.
(The latter is somewhat unexpected because Brazil trades more with the US than with
the euro area. We come back to this issue when we discuss the historical decomposition
below.) The OIC factor accounts for non-negligible fractions in the variance of Brazilian
and Asian GDP growth but is of minor importance for Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey.
Let us summarize the two main ndings of the forecast error variance decomposition.
First, we document that shocks originating in the OIC explain G7 GDP growth to a notable
extent at business cycle frequencies. Hence, neglecting non-G7 countries may lead to an
incomplete assessment of the sources and commonalities of G7 business cycle uctuations.
Second, our ndings are consistent with the narrative in the literature that group- and
regional-specic factors have emerged during the globalization era, as we identify two
business cycle clusters of English-speaking countries and euro area countries. The OIC are
much more heterogenous which is why no clear OIC factor emerged (even though we label
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Table 1.3: Forecast error variance decomposition based on the G14-
FSVAR: Common shocks, spillovers, and own-country shocks for the G7
Country h Fore-
cast
error
s.d.
Factor
1
Factor
2
Factor
3
Spill-
overs
from
G7
Spill-
overs
from
OIC
Own
shock
Canada
1 1.34 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76
2 1.32 0.41 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.48
4 1.23 0.49 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.24
8 1.07 0.42 0.06 0.02 0.28 0.08 0.13
France
1 1.33 0.15 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45
2 1.16 0.22 0.39 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.35
4 1.09 0.27 0.34 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.23
8 0.96 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.14
Germany
1 2.42 0.10 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67
2 2.01 0.18 0.37 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.36
4 1.78 0.23 0.36 0.01 0.13 0.10 0.18
8 1.59 0.24 0.29 0.00 0.22 0.17 0.09
Italy
1 1.79 0.05 0.65 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.28
2 1.66 0.08 0.61 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.20
4 1.54 0.11 0.47 0.01 0.10 0.17 0.13
8 1.32 0.12 0.33 0.01 0.22 0.22 0.10
Japan
1 3.20 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86
2 2.67 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.64
4 2.06 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.15 0.13 0.51
8 1.40 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.23 0.19 0.40
UK
1 1.61 0.21 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.60
2 1.54 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.59
4 1.57 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.61
8 1.48 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.62
US
1 1.78 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41
2 1.50 0.58 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.30
4 1.40 0.50 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.23
8 1.23 0.41 0.01 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.19
Notes: The table shows the square root of the forecast error variance of detrended GDP growth and its
decomposition into factors, spillovers, and own shocks. The results are based on the three factor G14-
FSVAR. The standard deviations are in percentage points at an annual level, i.e. 400/h times the forecast
error where h is the forecast horizon.
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Table 1.4: Forecast error variance decomposition based on the G14-
FSVAR: Common shocks, spillovers, and own-country shocks for the OIC
Country h Fore-
cast
error
s.d.
Factor
1
Factor
2
Factor
3
Spill-
overs
from
G7
Spill-
overs
from
OIC
Own
shock
Australia
1 1.86 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.80
2 1.25 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.70
4 0.84 0.16 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.62
8 0.52 0.19 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.54
Brazil
1 4.57 0.03 0.25 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.33
2 3.51 0.06 0.24 0.37 0.01 0.03 0.29
4 2.47 0.08 0.24 0.32 0.03 0.07 0.25
8 1.62 0.10 0.25 0.29 0.07 0.09 0.21
China
1 1.91 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.70
2 1.61 0.09 0.17 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.60
4 1.34 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.58
8 1.24 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.61
Mexico
1 3.72 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.79
2 3.37 0.25 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.64
4 2.80 0.32 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.47
8 2.00 0.34 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.39
South Africa
1 1.82 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.86
2 1.70 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.79
4 1.68 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.73
8 1.49 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.66
South Korea
1 3.96 0.10 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.69
2 3.30 0.11 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.65
4 2.70 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.61
8 1.88 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.57
Turkey
1 7.82 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.79
2 6.07 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.69
4 4.59 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.62
8 2.95 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.57
Notes: The table shows the square root of the forecast error variance of detrended GDP growth and its
decomposition into factors, spillovers, and own shocks. The results are based on the three factor G14-
FSVAR. The standard deviations are in percentage points at an annual level, i.e. 400/h times the forecast
error where h is the forecast horizon.
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it so). Based on the ndings of Mumtaz et al. (2011) and Hirata et al. (2013) we conjecture
that once quarterly GDP data of more countries become available for longer time periods,
a comparable analysis to ours may yield more than one additional factor which then can
be interpreted more straightforwardly as regional business cycle factors.
1.4.3 Historical decompositions for the G14 sample
Next we use the G14-FSVAR to assess for each country how the various shocks and fac-
tors contributed to the observed uctuations in detrended GDP growth. These historical
decompositions are displayed in Figures 1.3 to 1.16. In each panel of a gure we depict
realized GDP growth (black) together with a hypothetical series (blue) that results from a
counterfactual analysis in which certain shocks are set to their estimates and all others are
shut down. Specically, we report the contributions of: factors one to three in the three
upper panels, the own shock in the lower left panel, all idiosyncratic G7 shocks (except for
the own shock if a G7 country is considered) in the lower middle panel, and all idiosyncratic
OIC shocks (except for the own shock if a OIC country is considered) in the lower right
panel. This allows us to assess how relevant factors, idiosyncratic shocks and spillovers are
for specic historical episodes.
The most pronounced episode in the sample is the Great Recession which is visible as
a large negative spike for all countries at the end of 2008 or the beginning of 2009. The
decomposition indicates that both the US and the euro factor contributed strongly to the
Great Recession. The idiosyncratic shocks of Germany, the UK, Brazil, China, and Mexico
also account for part of the downturn in these countries and subsequently spilled over to
other countries. According to these results, the Great Recession was thus the outcome of
a multitude of international and country-specic shocks.
The European debt crisis that started in 2010 is clearly visible in the evolution of
French, German, and Italian GDP growth and almost fully absorbed by the second factor.
This observation strengthens its interpretation as a euro factor. Based on the historical
decomposition, we can now also answer the question why the euro factor accounts for about
a quarter of the forecast error variance of Brazilian GDP growth. The upper middle panel
of Figure 1.11 shows that the euro factor contributed markedly to the Brazilian business
cycle during the Great Recession but also at the end of the 1990s and during the European
debt crisis.
Finally, we use the historical decomposition to better understand the relevance of the
OIC for the G7 business cycles. While the OIC factor has little to say about G7 GDP
growth, spillovers from idiosyncratic OIC shocks make a dierence (see lower right panels
in Figures 1.3 to 1.9). In particular, the recovery from the Asian crisis after 1998 and the
subsequent slowdown appears to have contributed to the business cycles in the euro area
countries but also, to a smaller extent, in Canada and Japan.
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Figure 1.3: Historical decompositions  Canada
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Notes: In each panel of the gure we show the realized series of detrended GDP growth (black) and
a hypothetical series (blue) that is implied by the G14-FSVAR. The hypothetical series results from a
counterfactual analysis in which one (set of) structural shock(s) is allowed for. Details are given in section
1.4.3.
Figure 1.4: Historical decompositions  France
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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Figure 1.5: Historical decompositions  Germany
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
Figure 1.6: Historical decompositions  Italy
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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Figure 1.7: Historical decompositions  Japan
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
Figure 1.8: Historical decompositions  UK
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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Figure 1.9: Historical decompositions  US
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
Figure 1.10: Historical decompositions  Australia
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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Figure 1.11: Historical decompositions  Brazil
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
Figure 1.12: Historical decompositions  China
1998 2003 2008 2013
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Effect of factor 1 alone
1998 2003 2008 2013
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Effect of factor 2 alone
1998 2003 2008 2013
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Effect of factor 3 alone
1998 2003 2008 2013
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Effect of own shock alone
1998 2003 2008 2013
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Effect of all other G7 shocks
1998 2003 2008 2013
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Effect of all other OIC shocks
See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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Figure 1.13: Historical decompositions  Mexico
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
Figure 1.14: Historical decompositions  South Africa
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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Figure 1.15: Historical decompositions  South Korea
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
Figure 1.16: Historical decompositions  Turkey
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See gure 1.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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1.4.4 Impulse response functions for the G14 sample
In order to fully appreciate the results of the G14 sample, we show the impulse responses
of detrended GDP growth to an increase of one standard deviation in each of the factors,
see Figures 1.17 to 1.20 where we display the point estimates together with a bootstrapped
68 percent condence interval.
The instantaneous responses to the US factor are positive in all countries and fade
out after 4 to 6 quarters implying that an expansion in the US goes hand in hand with a
simultaneous world upswing. The point estimates appear quantitatively relevant for most
countries even if statistical signicance as indicated by the condence interval is limited to
Canada, UK, US, Australia, and Mexico. Given the relatively short sample, the latter is
not very surprising.
The euro factor has quantitatively relevant and statistically signicant positive eects
on all countries except for the US, which is by assumption, and Australia. They are
particulary pronounced and statistically signicant in the European countries but also in
Japan, Brazil, China, and Turkey, which coincides well with the results of the forecast
error variance decomposition.
The OIC factor has negligible eects on the G7 countries. Given our identifying restric-
tions, this is expected. However, an increase in the OIC factor strongly and signicantly
elevates detrended GDP growth in the Asian OIC countries (China, South Korea, Turkey),
and in Brazil and South Africa. This corroborates our interpretation of it as an OIC, and
not a purely regional, shock.
1.5 The relevance of OIC shocks
In this section, we further assess the relevance of uctuations originating from outside the
G7 for the global and G7 business cycles. To this end, we estimate for important global
and G7 macroeconomic indicators the forecast error variance shares accounted for by the
OIC factor and the idiosyncratic OIC shocks. All indicators are made stationary by taking
(log) dierences if necessary. In addition, we ltered out any secular trend by applying the
same detrending procedure as for GDP growth (for details, see section A.4).
1.5.1 Indicators of the world business cycle
In the rst step, we focus on the association between OIC shocks and global business cycle
indicators zit. A straightforward way to measure this association is to augment the G14-
FSVAR with the indicators, re-estimate it, and invert it to compute h-step forecast error
variance decompositions. However, this would entail estimating a large number of extra
parameters in an already highly parameterized model or require additional zero restrictions
that are potentially controversial. Therefore, we directly estimate the inverted augmented
G14-FSVAR, see Kilian (2009) for a comparable approach. Specically, consider the mov-
ing average representation of such an augmented FSVAR of which the equation for an
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Figure 1.17: Impulse response functions
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Notes: In each gure we show the impulse response functions of detrended GDP growth to a shock of one
standard deviations in the factors 1-3. The black solid lines are impulse responses from the G14-FSVAR.
The dashed black lines are the respective standard deviations resulting from a bootstrapping and 1000
re-estimations.
32 Chapter 1. The G7 Business Cycle in a Globalized World
Figure 1.18: Impulse response functions
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See gure 1.17 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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Figure 1.19: Impulse response functions
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See gure 1.17 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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Figure 1.20: Impulse response functions
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See gure 1.17 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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indicator zit is
zit = [φ
1
0 φ
2
0 φ
3
0]
ftξt
εt
+ [φ11 φ21 φ31]
ft−1ξt−1
εt−1
+ · · · ,
where ft denotes the (3 × 1) dimensional vector of global factors, ξt denotes the (14 × 1)
dimensional vector of idiosyncratic shocks, and εt takes up all additional shocks. By
assumption, ft, ξt, and εt are mutually and serially uncorrelated. Hence, to infer the 1-
step forecast error variance share accounted for by OIC shocks, we simply compute the
R-squared, R2OIC, of the regression
zit = φ
1,OIC
0 f
OIC
t + φ
2,OIC
0 ξ
OIC
t + ut,
where fOICt denotes the OIC factor, and ξ
OIC
t denotes the (7 × 1) dimensional vector of
idiosyncratic OIC shocks. Similarly, for the G7 we compute the R-squared, R2G7, of the
regression
zit = φ
1,G7
0 f
G7
t + φ
2,G7
0 ξ
G7
t + ut,
where fG7t denotes the two G7 factors, and ξ
G7
t denotes the (7× 1) dimensional vector of
idiosyncratic G7 shocks.
To obtain the 2-step forecast error variance share accounted for by OIC shocks, we
compute the R-squared of the regression
zit = φ
1,OIC
0 f
OIC
t + φ
2,OIC
0 ξ
OIC
t + φ
1,OIC
1 f
OIC
t−1 + φ
2,OIC
1 ξ
OIC
t−1 + ut
and compare it to the R-squared of an analogous regression for the G7. Due to the limited
number of observations in our sample, we refrain from estimating forecast error variance
shares for forecasts of higher horizon than two even though this seems fruitful given that
OIC shocks are particularly relevant at business cycle frequencies.
In Table 1.5 we report the variance shares of detrended global macro indicators ac-
counted for by all shocks extracted from the G14-FSVAR (computed as R2G7 +R
2
OIC) and
the relative importance of the OIC factor and shocks (computed as R2OIC/(R
2
G7 +R
2
OIC)).
Note that the assumption of mutual and serial uncorrelatedness is not exactly satised in
sample. While there remains only a limited amount of cross-correlation, we nevertheless
orthogonalize the OIC factor and each idiosyncratic OIC shock as follows. We regress each
of them on the G7 factors and idiosyncratic G7 shocks and use the residuals. This parallels
a Choleski decomposition and thus implies an ordering of G7 before the OIC. Therefore,
the variance shares accounted for by OIC factors and shocks should be interpreted as lower
bound estimates.
We nd that all G14 shocks together account for a large fraction of the forecast error
variance of all included global macro indicators. This is expected because the G14 con-
tribute 70% percent to world output. Shocks originating in the OIC play an interesting
role. While they are moderately relevant for uctuations in real quantities like OECD GDP,
world industrial production, and world trade, their relative R-squared varies between 10
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Table 1.5: Forecast error variance shares of global business cycle indicators
accounted for by G7 and OIC shocks
All shocks OIC shocks
Indicator h = 1 h = 2 h = 1 h = 2
OECD GDP 0.39 0.71 0.01 0.06
World industrial production 0.33 0.69 0.03 0.10
CPB world trade 0.27 0.57 0.01 0.11
CPB manufacturing prices 0.13 0.39 0.29 0.19
Brent oil price 0.33 0.57 0.27 0.43
World fuel prices 0.38 0.63 0.29 0.44
World commodity prices 0.36 0.51 0.10 0.16
MSCI World 0.34 0.54 0.15 0.22
Ination volatility 0.16 0.42 0.26 0.33
Stock market volatility 0.26 0.54 0.18 0.18
Exchange rate volatility 0.40 0.60 0.42 0.53
Note: h denotes the forecast horizon. The columns All shocks report the variance share accounted for by
all factors and shocks extracted from the G14-FSVAR, R2G7+R
2
OIC. The columns OIC shocks report the
variance share of all shocks accounted for by OIC factors and shocks, R2OIC/(R
2
G7 +R
2
OIC). The variables
are described in section A.4.
and 53 percent for world market prices and price volatilities. For example, all G14 shocks
explain 33 percent of the one-quarter ahead variance and 57 percent of the two-quarter
ahead variance of the Brent oil price, of which 27 percent and 43 percent, respectively, are
contributed by OIC shocks. This result is in line with Aastveit et al. (2015) and Kilian
and Hicks (2013) who nd that demand shocks in the emerging markets have contributed
markedly to the rise in oil prices during the past decade. The numbers are also relatively
high for ination and exchange rate volatility. Even 22 percent of the two-quarter ahead
variance in the world MSCI that can be explained by G14 shocks are accounted for by the
OIC. These results parallel the nding of Eickmeier and Kühnlenz (2016) who nd that
Chinese shocks aect global ination dynamics signicantly.
We thus conclude that OIC shocks are particularly important for high-frequency uc-
tuations in international price movements and volatilities, much more than for quantities.
This indicates that, at the horizon of half a year, prices react much more elastically to OIC
shocks than quantities. With the limited data set at hand it is however dicult to spec-
ulate about the reasons. One possibility is that prices overshoot while output and trade
volumes are generally less aected by developments within the OIC. However, we tend to
the interpretation that real quantities simply react with a delay of 4 or even 8 quarters,
a regularity we uncovered above using the G14-FSVAR. We leave this question to future
research because it requires the availability of longer time series which would allow us to
estimate regressions for, say, horizons h = 4 and h = 8.
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1.5.2 Indicators of the national G7 business cycles
In the next step, we assess the relationship between OIC shocks and national business
cycle indicators of the G7. We estimate 1-step and 2-step forecast error variance shares in
the same way as above. We report the relative importance of the OIC factor and shocks,
again computed as R2OIC/(R
2
G7 +R
2
OIC), in Table 1.6.
The results indicate that OIC shocks are relevant for important aspects of the G7
business cycles that are complementary to GDP. We replicate our previous nding that OIC
shocks do not contribute appreciably to the understanding of short-run GDP uctuations4.
Similarly, at the one and two quarter horizon they generally have also limited explanatory
power for GDP components such as investment, private consumption, imports, and exports.
In contrast, they contribute, relative to G7 shocks, noticeably to uctuations in variables
of the labor market (employment, unemployment rate) and the external sector (current
account balance in percent of GDP, real and nominal eective exchange rate). As already
documented for the world indicators above, we also nd that OIC shocks account for non-
negligible fractions of the forecast variance in nominal variables (ination, interest rate,
stock market returns) and volatilities. Again, this picture may change once longer time
series become available and typical business cycle horizons like h = 4 and h = 8 can be
examined.
1.6 Robustness checks
In this section we report the results of an extensive robustness analysis. Table 1.7 displays,
for each country, the forecast error variance decomposition at horizon h = 4 computed
from the three factor G14-FSVAR. In the rst row of each country panel, we report the
results of the baseline G14-FSVAR discussed above. In the subsequent rows we show the
outcomes of various ceteris-paribus changes in the estimation setup. We discuss the details
in the following.
Clustered factor loadings
In the baseline G14-FSVAR, we rotated the rst two factors such that their correlation
with the two factors of the G7-FSVAR was maximized. By this procedure, the factor
loading matrix Γ was implicitly dened. Alternatively, in accordance with the literature
and our previous ndings, we now identify a continental-European and an English-speaking
business cycle cluster by directly restricting the factor loading matrix. Specically, we
restrict the rst factor to load only on Canada, the UK, and US; the second factor to load
only on France, Germany, and Italy; and the third factor to load only on the OIC.
The results are qualitatively robust to the baseline (see row Clustered loadings). The
three factors identied under the baseline and alternative identication procedures exhibit
large correlations with each other (96% for the rst factor, 77% for the second factor, and
92% for the third factor). This result corroborates our previous interpretation of the three
4Since we use the same detrended GDP growth here as in the G14-FSVAR above, this is an expected
outcome. In fact, the results are, up to approximation error, quantitatively identical.
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Table 1.6: Forecast error variance shares of G7 business cycle indicators
accounted for by OIC shocks
Indicator h CAN FRA GER ITA JAP UK US
GDP 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00
2 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.05 0.03
Investment 1 0.29 0.01 0.03 0.28 0.18 0.21 0.02
2 0.20 0.07 0.17 0.26 0.36 0.14 0.07
Private consumption 1 0.24 0.10 0.24 0.17 0.06 0.44 0.21
2 0.25 0.08 0.19 0.16 0.22 0.49 0.39
Imports 1 0.03 0.40 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.07
2 0.06 0.32 0.12 0.10 0.35 0.30 0.10
Exports 1 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.08 0.05
2 0.02 0.23 0.18 0.26 0.19 0.11 0.10
Employment 1 0.26 0.40 0.42 0.19 0.29 0.29 0.27
2 0.14 0.28 0.43 0.34 0.31 0.18 0.23
Unemployment rate 1 0.23 0.21 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.41 0.33
2 0.23 0.26 0.45 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.31
Current account balance 1 0.32 0.58 0.35 0.45 0.20 0.13 0.17
2 0.32 0.58 0.28 0.47 0.21 0.24 0.34
Real eective exchange rate 1 0.31 0.38 0.30 0.56 0.26 0.26 0.22
2 0.34 0.18 0.23 0.44 0.48 0.24 0.24
Nominal e. exchange rate 1 0.29 0.38 0.39 0.57 0.27 0.31 0.14
2 0.31 0.21 0.28 0.49 0.47 0.24 0.18
CPI ination 1 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.70 0.13 0.19 0.13
2 0.41 0.33 0.28 0.63 0.16 0.41 0.25
10-year government bond rate 1 0.46 0.51 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.24 0.29
2 0.51 0.56 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.30 0.30
Stock market returns 1 0.32 0.24 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.21
2 0.36 0.39 0.26 0.38 0.24 0.32 0.25
Ination volatility 1 0.43 0.42 0.29 0.14 0.40 0.32 0.39
2 0.32 0.29 0.17 0.30 0.45 0.19 0.22
Stock market volatility 1 0.23 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.21 0.15
2 0.19 0.26 0.31 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.19
Exchange rate volatility 1 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.16 0.18 0.20
2 0.14 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.21 0.22 0.24
Note: h denotes the forecast horizon. Reported is the variance share of all shocks accounted for by OIC factor and
shocks extracted from the G14-FSVAR, R2
OIC
/(R2
G7
+R2
OIC
). The variables are described in section A.4.
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factors identied by rotation as US, euro, and OIC factors. The forecast error variance
decompositions also do not dier strongly between identication procedures except that
under the alternative restrictions on the factor loadings, the factors are more targeted
to the respective country sets. In particular, the rst factor accounts for a larger share of
the forecast variance of the UK than before and a smaller share of non English-speaking
countries. The second factor becomes more tightly associated with France and Germany
but less so with all countries outside the euro area. Finally, the third factor becomes more
important for the OIC while its relevance for the G7  which we are particularly interested
in  remains near zero.
We do not use this alternative identication procedure as our baseline because it im-
poses strong zero restrictions that are statistically rejected at the 1 percent level if tested
against an unrestricted three factor FSVAR.
Including outliers
As a further robustness check we show that the trimming procedure by which any detrended
quarterly growth rate that is further than ve times the interquartile range away from
the median is set to the respective threshold does not drive the estimation results. This
procedure identied two lower outliers, namely the recessions in Mexico in 1995Q1 and
South Korea in 1998Q1, and one upper outlier, namely Turkey in 1994Q2. We trimmed
these three outliers in order to prevent them from overly inuencing variance estimates
and variance decompositions. However, including the three outliers as they are leads to
results barely distinguishable from the baseline results (see row Incl. outliers).
Alternative lag order
For the baseline G14-FSVAR models we chose a lag order of p = 4 but restricted the o-
diagonal elements of the coecient matrices A2 to A4 to zero. While we argued above that
this should be appropriate for our analysis, here we examine how sensitive our results are
to this assumption. As a rst check, we use information criteria to determine the lag order.
It turns out that the AIC, BIC, and HQ all prefer p = 1. Re-running the G14-FSVAR
based on this specication yields only negligible changes in the results (see row VAR(1)
of Table 1.7).
We also check whether our baseline specication is too restrictive. A concern is that
business cycle dynamics may lead to spillovers lagged by more than one quarter in which
case our baseline results may underestimate the true cross-country connectedness. How-
ever, estimating four unrestricted coecient matrices A1 to A4 of dimension 14 × 14 by
OLS/GLS may ask too much of the data. Therefore, we replace the OLS/GLS step of
our estimation procedure with a shrinkage estimator. Specically, we apply a Bayesian
approach with Normal-Wishart prior on the VAR coecients. We follow standard prac-
tice and use the procedure developed by Litterman (1986) with modications proposed by
Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997), Sims and Zha (1998) and Ba«bura et al. (2010), see section
A.2 for details.
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Table 1.7: Forecast error variance decompositions: Robustness checks
Country Restriction Forecast
error
standard
deviation
Factor 1+
Factor 2+
Spillovers
from G7
Factor 3 Spill-
overs
from
OIC
Own
shock
Canada
Baseline 1.23 0.70 0.00 0.04 0.24
Clustered loadings 1.13 0.66 0.00 0.06 0.28
Incl. outliers 1.23 0.71 0.00 0.04 0.25
VAR(1) 1.26 0.70 0.00 0.05 0.24
Bayesian VAR 0.97 0.70 0.00 0.07 0.23
Time-varying variance 1.22 0.71 0.00 0.04 0.25
G19 1.16 0.68 0.01 0.16 0.15
Drop Australia 1.20 0.68 0.01 0.06 0.26
Drop Brazil 1.23 0.71 0.00 0.05 0.23
Drop China 1.25 0.73 0.00 0.03 0.24
Drop Mexico 1.22 0.70 0.03 0.05 0.22
Drop South Africa 1.23 0.72 0.00 0.04 0.23
Drop South Korea 1.22 0.71 0.01 0.03 0.25
Drop Turkey 1.23 0.71 0.00 0.03 0.25
France
Baseline 1.09 0.70 0.00 0.08 0.23
Clustered loadings 1.02 0.79 0.01 0.09 0.12
Incl. outliers 1.09 0.73 0.00 0.06 0.20
VAR(1) 1.11 0.67 0.00 0.08 0.24
Bayesian VAR 0.93 0.61 0.03 0.07 0.29
Time-varying variance 1.09 0.72 0.00 0.06 0.23
G19 1.12 0.74 0.00 0.14 0.12
Drop Australia 1.10 0.71 0.01 0.06 0.23
Drop Brazil 1.09 0.72 0.01 0.08 0.19
Drop China 1.16 0.74 0.00 0.03 0.22
Drop Mexico 1.09 0.67 0.01 0.09 0.23
Drop South Africa 1.10 0.69 0.00 0.08 0.22
Drop South Korea 1.09 0.78 0.01 0.05 0.16
Drop Turkey 1.08 0.70 0.00 0.06 0.24
Germany
Baseline 1.78 0.72 0.01 0.10 0.18
Clustered loadings 1.57 0.62 0.01 0.14 0.23
Incl. outliers 1.79 0.75 0.00 0.08 0.17
VAR(1) 1.78 0.71 0.00 0.12 0.17
Bayesian VAR 1.53 0.74 0.00 0.14 0.11
Time-varying variance 1.78 0.73 0.00 0.08 0.19
G19 2.00 0.71 0.01 0.15 0.14
Drop Australia 1.79 0.72 0.00 0.10 0.18
Drop Brazil 1.79 0.69 0.01 0.13 0.17
Drop China 1.80 0.74 0.00 0.09 0.17
Drop Mexico 1.78 0.68 0.01 0.13 0.18
Drop South Africa 1.83 0.70 0.01 0.10 0.19
Drop South Korea 1.80 0.74 0.01 0.08 0.17
Drop Turkey 1.77 0.72 0.01 0.10 0.17
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Table 1.7 continued
Country Restriction Forecast
error
standard
deviation
Factor 1+
Factor 2+
Spillovers
from G7
Factor 3 Spill-
overs
from
OIC
Own
shock
Italy
Baseline 1.54 0.68 0.01 0.17 0.13
Clustered loadings 1.43 0.50 0.00 0.21 0.29
Incl. outliers 1.54 0.70 0.02 0.13 0.15
VAR(1) 1.54 0.68 0.00 0.17 0.15
Bayesian VAR 1.27 0.72 0.00 0.15 0.13
Time-varying variance 1.53 0.70 0.01 0.14 0.14
G19 1.69 0.57 0.02 0.32 0.10
Drop Australia 1.57 0.79 0.00 0.10 0.11
Drop Brazil 1.56 0.69 0.00 0.17 0.13
Drop China 1.58 0.77 0.00 0.12 0.11
Drop Mexico 1.56 0.62 0.02 0.19 0.17
Drop South Africa 1.56 0.67 0.00 0.19 0.14
Drop South Korea 1.55 0.71 0.02 0.08 0.20
Drop Turkey 1.52 0.65 0.04 0.13 0.19
Japan
Baseline 2.06 0.35 0.01 0.13 0.51
Clustered loadings 1.97 0.21 0.01 0.14 0.65
Incl. outliers 2.07 0.34 0.03 0.12 0.50
VAR(1) 2.13 0.34 0.01 0.10 0.55
Bayesian VAR 1.73 0.39 0.10 0.14 0.38
Time-varying variance 2.05 0.35 0.01 0.09 0.55
G19 2.18 0.45 0.02 0.20 0.32
Drop Australia 2.07 0.31 0.01 0.18 0.50
Drop Brazil 2.13 0.30 0.45 0.19 0.06
Drop China 2.09 0.34 0.00 0.15 0.50
Drop Mexico 2.11 0.34 0.08 0.18 0.41
Drop South Africa 2.14 0.30 0.02 0.12 0.57
Drop South Korea 2.14 0.30 0.25 0.16 0.28
Drop Turkey 2.06 0.29 0.02 0.17 0.52
UK
Baseline 1.57 0.29 0.05 0.05 0.61
Clustered loadings 1.72 0.28 0.01 0.05 0.66
Incl. outliers 1.57 0.28 0.01 0.04 0.67
VAR(1) 1.60 0.27 0.04 0.04 0.64
Bayesian VAR 1.34 0.37 0.00 0.05 0.59
Time-varying variance 1.56 0.30 0.05 0.04 0.61
G19 1.63 0.30 0.07 0.13 0.50
Drop Australia 1.59 0.31 0.09 0.02 0.58
Drop Brazil 1.59 0.26 0.04 0.05 0.65
Drop China 1.60 0.29 0.04 0.05 0.63
Drop Mexico 1.61 0.32 0.43 0.06 0.19
Drop South Africa 1.60 0.26 0.05 0.04 0.65
Drop South Korea 1.58 0.33 0.09 0.04 0.54
Drop Turkey 1.55 0.31 0.02 0.05 0.62
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Table 1.7 continued
Country Restriction Forecast
error
standard
deviation
Factor 1+
Factor 2+
Spillovers
from G7
Factor 3 Spill-
overs
from
OIC
Own
shock
US
Baseline 1.40 0.68 0.04 0.05 0.23
Clustered loadings 1.43 0.70 0.02 0.05 0.23
Incl. outliers 1.40 0.70 0.02 0.05 0.24
VAR(1) 1.39 0.67 0.04 0.06 0.23
Bayesian VAR 1.07 0.65 0.01 0.06 0.28
Time-varying variance 1.38 0.68 0.03 0.05 0.24
G19 1.44 0.85 0.05 0.09 0.00
Drop Australia 1.38 0.54 0.06 0.03 0.36
Drop Brazil 1.40 0.64 0.02 0.05 0.29
Drop China 1.42 0.67 0.03 0.04 0.26
Drop Mexico 1.43 0.43 0.13 0.05 0.40
Drop South Africa 1.42 0.69 0.03 0.03 0.25
Drop South Korea 1.43 0.59 0.03 0.04 0.34
Drop Turkey 1.40 0.59 0.02 0.05 0.34
Notes: The entries are forecast error standard deviations of detrended GDP growth and their decomposition into
factors, spillovers, and own shocks at horizon h = 4. The row Baseline refers to results from the rotated three-factor
G14-FSVAR from section 1.4. The subsequent rows report results from ceteris-paribus changes to that estimation
setup.
An important dierence to classical estimation is shrinkage towards a prior which we
specify in line with the literature as a diagonal VAR model with one lag. Hence, the
Bayesian estimates of the o-diagonal elements are shrunk towards zero and thus away
from non-zero spillovers. Our results thus depend on the amount of shrinkage which is
controlled by the parameter λ. For λ = 0 the posterior equals the prior, while for λ→∞
the posterior equals the ML estimator. Carriero et al. (2015a) report that a choice of
λ = 0.5 is optimal in a forecasting sense for a monthly VAR model of 18 US variables
irrespective of the lag order. As we include a similar number of variables, we follow that
paper. In the row BVAR we report the variance decomposition computed for a FSVAR
that is estimated based on the posterior means of the VAR matrices A1 to A4. We nd
that our conclusions remain largely unchanged.
Time-varying volatility
There is evidence that macroeconomic variables exhibit time-varying volatility, see, e.g.,
Stock and Watson (2012) and Keating and Valcarcel (2012). While our G14 sample of
1991Q1 to 2014Q4 mainly covers the Great Moderation for which volatility changes might
be less of a problem, it also includes the Asian crisis and the Great Recession. We therefore
check whether our baseline assumption of constant volatility distorts the results.
We based most of our conclusions on variance decompositions, which are a function
of both variance matrices of the structural shocks, Σf and Σξ, and the VAR coecient
matrices A1 to A4. Giving up the assumption of constant volatility can aect the estimated
variance decompositions along these two dimensions. On the one hand, shifts in the relative
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variance of two structural shocks obviously changes their relative importance as borne
out by a variance decomposition. On the other hand, OLS/GLS estimation of the VAR
parameter matrices A1 to A4 based on the (wrong) assumption of constant volatility is
inecient compared to a GLS estimator that takes the time-varying volatility into account.
In the following, we directly analyze only the second dimension. However, since we nd
only mild heteroscedasticity, we conclude that shifts in relative variances are not a major
issue in our sample.
Since it is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate a FSVAR with stochastic volatility
in the spirit of Aguilar and West (2000), we proceed as follows. In a rst step, we estimate
the parameters of the baseline G14-FSVAR under the assumption of constant volatility and
extract the structural shocks, xt = (f ′t , ξ
′
t)
′. As these shocks are assumed to be independent,
we then estimate univariate stochastic volatility models for each of these shocks. Finally,
we re-estimate the FSVAR parameters by feasible GLS taking the estimated time-varying
volatilities into account.
We specify and estimate univariate stochastic volatility models as proposed by Justini-
ano and Primiceri (2008) and Chan and Hsiao (2013). Each of the structural shocks xit is
assumed to follow
xit = e
1
2
hitεit. (1.7)
Hence, the conditional variance of xit is Var(xit|hit) = ehit . Like Justiniano and Primiceri
(2008) we specify log-volatility as a random walk
hit = hi,t−1 + ζit (1.8)
with independent shocks εit ∼ N(0, 1) and ζit ∼ N(0, ω2i ). We estimate the model us-
ing 20,000 draws from the Gibbs sampler. Further details regarding the priors and the
estimation can be found in section A.3.
Figures 1.21 and 1.22 display the posterior means and posterior 95% intervals of the
time-varying standard deviation exp(ht/2) of the estimated shocks. For comparison we also
show the squares of the respective series. It turns out that the majority of structural shocks
exhibit only a moderate degree of heteroscedasticity, especially if one takes estimation
uncertainty into account5. Exceptions are due to the Great Recession and the economic
crises some emerging market had to face. Given that our sample begins in 1991 and thus
after the Great Moderation started, this result is not particularly surprising. Accordingly,
taking the estimated time-varying volatilities into account when we estimate the FSVAR
parameters by feasible GLS does not change the results to a notable extent. As shown
in row Time-varying variance of Table 1.7 the variance decompositions remain almost
identical.
5When we allow the log-volatilities to follow stationary AR(1) processes, hit = µ+φhi,t−1+ζit, |φ| < 1,
they are estimated as even less volatile. As a robustness check, we also tted stationary GARCH models
to each xit and obtained the same result that variances are only moderately time-varying if at all.
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Figure 1.21: Time-varying variances of GDP growth
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Notes: In each panel of the gure we show the series of squared detrended GDP growth (black) and the
time-varying variance of detrended GDP growth (solid blue) implied by the stochastic volatility model. In
addition, 95% condence intervals are reported (dashed blue). Details are given in section A.3.
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Figure 1.22: Time-varying variances of GDP growth
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Notes: In each panel of the gure we show the series of squared detrended GDP growth (black) and the
time-varying variance of detrended GDP growth (solid blue) implied by the stochastic volatility model. In
addition, 95% condence intervals are reported (dashed blue). Details are given in section A.3.
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Alternative country samples
In this section we examine whether an alternative composition of the country sample
changes our results. Recall that we included only 14 of the G20 countries to be able to start
estimation in 1991. Adding the remaining ve countries6 requires to postpone the sample
start to 1996Q2 for data availability. Using the shorter sample, we re-estimate the three-
factor FSVAR including 19 countries as a robustness check. The variance decomposition
under this alternative country sample is very similar to the baseline G14-FSVAR in terms
of the G7 factors and spillovers (see row G19). As expected, the share that is due to
spillovers from the OIC increases notably and for all countries. While estimation precision
may be an issue here, this result strengthens our main nding that spillovers from the OIC
are a relevant source of business cycle uctuations for the G7.
In a nal step we examine whether excluding single OIC countries from the G14 sample
makes a dierence. To this end, we re-estimate the three factor FSVAR using 13 instead
of 14 countries, leaving everything else equal. In most cases, the results from the baseline
G14-FSVAR remain qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged (see rows Drop country
XY  in Table 1.7). There are two exceptions. First, when we drop South Korea or Brazil
factor 3 becomes a kind of Japanese factor, accounting for a much higher share of the
Japanese forecast error variance, while the relevance of the idiosyncratic Japanese shock
decreases by the same amount. This is plausible because in the baseline G14-FSVAR the
third factor loads most strongly on South Korea or Brazil. Dropping one of these countries
lets Japan ll the gap. Second, dropping Mexico aects the rotation of the rst and, due to
orthogonality, also of the third factor so that the third factor becomes a kind of UK factor
similar as discussed for Japan above. These cases show that it is important to include
a large enough set of non-G7 countries in order to be able to identify a non-G7 factor.
Nevertheless, the results for the G7 countries other than the UK and Japan are almost
unaected by the restrictions on the country sample. In addition, the OIC spillover shares
remain robust for all G7 countries, so our main result that OIC spillovers are quantitatively
relevant for the G7 business cycle remains intact.
1.7 Conclusion
Based on a sample of 14 countries out of the G20, this paper documents the empirical
relevance of countries that are often referred to as small or emerging for both the global
business cycle and the national business cycles of the G7. Output innovations originating
outside the G7 contribute noticeably, relative to G7 output innovations, to uctuations
in important global macroeconomic indicators. In addition, they account for shares of
almost 25 percent in the business cycle uctuations of national G7 GDP growth, mainly
due to spillovers of idiosyncratic shocks. The shares are even higher when other national
G7 variables such as employment, the current account balance, ination, and ination
volatility are considered. Finally, the spillovers appear to be transmitted particularly
6These are Argentina, India, Indonesia, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. We leave out the European Union
because its major four member countries are already included.
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through world market returns and prices, and their volatilities. The results indicate that
the narrative that regional and group-specic factors dominate the international business
cycle is not the complete story. In a globalized world spillovers from emerging markets and
industrial countries other than the G7 play a relevant role for major aspects of the G7 and
world business cycle.
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Abstract
I examine the impact of the Chinese economic slowdown that started after the Great
Recession on global ination dynamics. To this end, I t a high-dimensional data set
comprising macroeconomic indicators of 41 countries to a structural factor-augmented
vector autoregressive model. My main ndings are the following: (i) Business cycle shocks
and especially demand shocks in China signicantly spill over to ination rates in the US,
Europe, Asia, and Oceania and are transmitted by global oil, commodity, and steel prices.
(ii) The decline in Chinese growth rates can be attributed to a combination of negative
aggregate demand and supply shocks. (iii) Historical decompositions indicate that after
2014, these shocks lowered PPI ination rates outside of China by up to 0.3 percentage
points per quarter, resulting in a cumulative eect on the PPI of six percent. Hence,
they markedly contributed to the decline in global ination rates and hampered the recent
upward trend. (iv) The Chinese inuence is also reected in interest rates outside of China
by a reduction of yields at the current edge.
Keywords: China's Economic Slowdown, Global ination, Spillovers, Factor Augmented
Vector Autoregressive Model
JEL classication: E31, E32, E43
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2.1 Introduction
It is widely known that ination rates have been globally declining after the Great Reces-
sion, reaching values close to zero. Figure 2.1 shows that from 2011 to 2015, they fell in
all economic areas of the world and increased again only recently. In the US, for example,
CPI ination fell from 3.2 percent in 2011 to 0.1 percent in 2015.
While this decline can be partly explained by domestic factors (Ciccarelli et al., 2017
and Bobeica et al., 2017), there is also evidence pointing to inuence from the emerging
economies, especially from China. Aastveit et al. (2015), for example, show that the
demand from emerging economies has become twice as important as the demand from
developed countries in accounting for the uctuations in oil prices. Besides, Eickmeier and
Kühnlenz (2016) nd that aggregate demand shocks from China account for eleven percent
in the variance of crude oil prices and ve percent in the variance of US consumer prices.
Figure 2.1: Global ination indicators
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Notes: The panels show four-quarter averages of year-on-year ination rates (in percentages). The national
ination rates are averaged over countries in Asia (Japan and South Korea), the eleven original Euro Area
countries, eight non-Euro countries, and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). The averages are weighted
according to the countries' shares in the group-specic nominal GDP aggregates. Source: OECD and own
calculations.
In light of these ndings, the question arises which role China played for global ination
rates during the last decade, notably since the Chinese business cycle experienced a marked
slowdown after the Great Recession. Figure 2.2 illustrates this slowdown in terms of
Chinese GDP growth and ination. After very high GDP growth rates of up to 13.1
percent in the period 2001-2007, the Great Recession kicked in and reduced GDP growth
to 8.7 percent in 2008. The subsequent, weak recovery in 2009 and 2010 is followed by
repeatedly falling growth rates, from 9.3 percent in 2010 to 4.5 percent in 20171. China's
ination rate lags behind output, dropping to -0.2 percent only in 2009. Afterwards, it
increased again to 7.8 percent in 2011 and then continuously fell to 0.1 percent in 2015.
In 2016, it increased once more and reached 4.0 percent in 2017.
1The GDP growth rate published by the World Bank slightly diers from that of Chang et al. (2016)
in 2016 and 2017. However, I show in section 2.5.4 that the choice between the two indicators does not
play a role in my conclusions.
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Figure 2.2: Chinese business cycle indicators
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Notes: The panels show four-quarter averages of year-on-year growth rates of Chinese real GDP and the
Chinese GDP deator (in percentages). Source: Chang et al. (2016) and own calculations.
As a result, we observe a substantial and persistent decline in Chinese GDP growth
and ination rates after 2011 and a trend reversal of ination rates in 2016. Furthermore,
China's business cycle was signicantly correlated with ination rates worldwide during
this period.
The aim of this work is to quantify the Chinese contribution to the decline in global
ination rates. To the best of my knowledge, this issue has not been examined in the
literature yet. Dizioli et al. (2016) only consider the impact of the Chinese business cycle on
real activity in ve major Asian economies. They nd that the Chinese inuence is larger in
economies which are commodity exporters and have strong trade links with China, namely
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Metelli and Natoli (2017) investigate the eects on
ination in the Euro Area and the United States using the NiGEM multi-country model.
They show that China's economic downturn has led to a signicant disination in both
regions. However, these results are based on dierent slowdown scenarios imposed on a
theoretical model and not on the data.
To empirically identify the Chinese business cycle, I use the factor-augmented vector
autoregressive model (FAVAR) suggested by Bernanke et al. (2005). The FAVAR allows
exible economic modeling while keeping dimensionality manageable. I proceed as follows:
First, I estimate a set of factors from a large data set of 749 national and international
macroeconomic time series covering nominal and real indicators of 41 major economies,
including all OECD countries. These factors are added to a classical VAR model of the
Chinese GDP growth rate and the Chinese ination rate serving as business cycle controls.
Subsequently, I identify aggregate supply and demand shocks in China by imposing sign
restrictions on the impulse response functions of the domestic indicators. To examine the
international propagation of these shocks, I compute impulse response functions of global
price indicators and national price indicators in the US, Europe, Asia, and Oceania. Using
historical decompositions, I additionally assess their role during the period of China's
cyclical downturn. I present the Chinese structural shock series over the course of the last
decade and quantify their impact on ination indicators worldwide. Finally, I examine the
implications for long-term interest rates in the tradition of the Fisher eect.
The results show that business cycle shocks and especially aggregate demand shocks in
China signicantly spill over to global oil, commodity, and steel prices and national ination
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rates in the US, Europe, Asia, and Oceania. The international eects are most substantial
in the US and generally translate more in terms of producer prices than consumer prices.
The decline in Chinese growth rates after the Great Recession can be attributed to a
combination of adverse aggregate demand and supply shocks. From 2014 onwards, these
shocks lowered CPI ination rates outside of China by up to 0.1 percentage points and
PPI ination rates by up to 0.3 percentage points per quarter. They cumulatively reduced
oil prices by twelve percent and foreign national PPIs by up to six percent. In accordance
with the Fisher eect and monetary policy rules, the shocks are also reected in interest
rates and thus nancial indicators outside of China. As a result, the Chinese economic
slowdown markedly contributed to the global decline in ination and interest rates and
hampered the recent upward trend.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In sections 2.2 and 2.3, I present the
FAVAR framework and details on the data. In section 2.4, I describe the identication and
estimation approach. In section 2.5, I discuss the results of an impulse response analysis,
the series of structural shocks, historical decompositions, and extensive robustness checks.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Factor-augmented vector autoregressive model
To assess the impact of Chinese business cycle shocks on global ination dynamics, I
employ a time series vector Xt comprising a large number of macroeconomic indicators
and countries. The large cross-section has the clear advantage that it allows analyzing
dierent world regions and ination categories and includes lots of information on global
business cycle dynamics. However, the number of time observations of macroeconomic time
series is typically small, hence I cannot include all series in a standard VAR jointly with
Chinese indicators. Instead, I estimate a two-variable VAR for the Chinese economy that I
augment by a latent but estimable common component of the series in Xt. Here I assume
that macroeconomic indicators are strongly driven by global and regional business cycle
uctuations and therefore can be reduced to a handful of common factors. By including
these factors in the VAR I keep the model parsimonious and, at the same time, I control
for international business cycle movements. This approach goes back to Bernanke et al.
(2005) who augment a VAR of the US economy by international factors to study the eects
of monetary policy shocks on real variables.
I start with a classical structural VAR:
A0Ft =
p∑
i=1
AiFt−i + εt (2.1)
that can be transformed into the reduced form
Ft =
p∑
i=1
BiFt−i + ut (2.2)
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where Bi = A
−1
0 Ai, i = 1, . . . , p, and ut = A
−1
0 εt. Ft = [H
′
t,∆cgdpt,∆cdeflt]
′ is k ×
1-dimensional and consists of r (latent) international factors Ht = [H1,t, . . . ,Hr,t]′, the
Chinese GDP growth rate (∆cgdpt), and the logarithmic dierence of the Chinese GDP
deator (∆cdeflt). As usual, it holds for the structural shocks εt and the reduced-form
shocks ut that E(ut) = E(εt) = 0, E(utu′t) = Σ and E(εtε
′
t) = Ik. The structural shocks
εt are identied by imposing sign restrictions on the reduced-form residuals ut (see, e.g.,
Faust, 1998; Canova and De Nicolò, 2003; Peersman, 2005; Uhlig, 2005). More details on
the identication and estimation of Ht and εt are described in section 2.4.
The relationship between Ft and Xt follows an approximate factor model along the
lines of Bai and Ng (2002) and Stock and Watson (2002):
Xt = ΛFt + Ξt (2.3)
Λ denotes the n × k-dimensional loading matrix of the factors Ft = [f1t, . . . , fkt]′ and
Ξt = [ξi,t, . . . , ξN,t]
′ is the vector of idiosyncratic components. The ξi,t's are orthogonal to
the factors Ft but are allowed to be weakly correlated between each other and over time
in the tradition of Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983).
2.3 Data and detrending
The data vector Xt comprises n = 749 national macroeconomic time series of 41 countries,
namely all OECD countries plus Brazil, Indonesia, India, Russia, and South Africa. For
every country I include, if available, GDP, investment, consumption, exports, imports,
bilateral exports/imports to/from China, consumer prices, producer prices, the GDP de-
ator, a broad monetary aggregate M3, overnight interest rates, 3-month and 10-year
rates, wages, unit labor costs, real eective exchange rates, employment, and unemploy-
ment rates. I also include the following international series: oil prices, fuel prices, steel
prices, commodity prices (excluding fuels), manufacturing prices, stock market returns and
their variance, ination variance, world GDP, world industrial production, trade volumes,
and the composite OECD leading indicator. The series are either taken from the OECD
databases or national statistics oces.
The Chinese indicators are taken from Chang et al. (2016), who construct a standard set
of macroeconomic time series comparable to those commonly used in the macroeconomic
literature on Western economies. Their main data source is the CEIC's China Premium
Database, which compiles China's ocial macroeconomic time series2.
The series are at quarterly frequency and span the period 2000Q1-2017Q4, resulting in
T = 72 observations. All of them except unemployment rates, interest rates, real eective
exchange rates, and variances are stationarized by taking logarithmic rst dierences. To
prevent my results from being driven by outliers, I follow Carstensen and Salzmann (2017)
2In the baseline specication of the FAVAR, the Chinese economy is represented by the (mean-adjusted)
GDP growth rate and the (mean-adjusted) ination rate. To account for the possibility that these rates
do not uctuate around a constant mean but, e.g. exhibit a secular productivity trend, I check in section
2.5.4 if detrending them with the local-level lter suggested by Stock and Watson (2005) alters my results.
Since this is not the case I refrain from using the lter in the baseline setup.
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and Stock and Watson (2005) in trimming any observation that is further than ve times
the interquartile range away from its median to the respective threshold.
Although the sample covers the Great Recession, I assume a constant volatility regime
in my model. I base parts of my conclusions on historical decompositions, which are
a function of both the variance matrix of the structural shocks E(εtε′t), and the VAR
coecient matrices Bi. On the one hand, shifts in the relative variance of two structural
shocks change their relative importance. On the other hand, Carstensen and Salzmann
(2017) found only mild heteroskedasticity in a factor structural VAR of the G20 countries
over the sample period 1991-2014. Since relaxing the assumption of a constant volatility
regime did not change their results, I conclude that heteroskedasticity is not a signicant
issue in my model, too.
2.4 Identication and Estimation
The rst step of estimating the FAVAR involves nding Ht. Extracting principal compo-
nents of Xt would be the standard practice here but might be problematic if Ht is supposed
to represent the international non-Chinese business cycle in the FAVAR system (2.1)-(2.3).
It is quite likely that the rst principal components of Xt do not only mirror the interna-
tional business cycle but also contain a share associated with the Chinese economy. In a
FAVAR that comprises Chinese GDP growth and ination and the principal components
of Xt it is therefore hard to distinguish Chinese shocks from international ones.
To account for this issue, I apply a cleaning procedure proposed by Bernanke et al.
(2005) that isolates the international business cycle from the Chinese observables ∆cdeflt
and ∆cgdpt. The cleaning is executed as follows: First, I extract the rst principal compo-
nents of Xt and take them as a rst estimate for the unobserved factors Ht, dened as Ĥ0t .
The number of principal components is determined by the IC2 criterion proposed by Bai
and Ng (2002) and accordingly set to r = 5 (see Table 2.1). The share in the variance of
Xt explained by these ve principal components amounts to 79 percent. In the next step, I
model Ĥ0t as a linear combination of Chinese and non-Chinese business cycle components:
Ĥ0t = bH∗Ĥ
∗ + bcdefl∆cdeflt + bcgdp∆cgdpt (2.4)
where Ĥ∗ represents the non-Chinese component. If this linear combination and especially
Ĥ∗ was known, the Chinese share could be removed from Ĥ0t by subtracting bcdefl∆cdeflt+
bcgdp∆cgdpt from it. Since this is not the case, I need to nd Ĥ∗ to estimate equation
(2.4) in a multiple regression. One way to obtain Ĥ∗ is to extract principal components
from the subset of Xt of slow-moving variables3, which by assumption are predetermined
concerning ∆cdeflt and ∆cgdpt. I follow Bernanke et al. (2005) in assuming that real
quantities and composite price indices are slow-moving. The remaining subset of fast-
moving variables accordingly consists of the monetary aggregate M3, interest rates, stock
market variables, exchange rates, and prices of oil, steel, and commodities. Hence, real
3The number of slow-moving variables amounts to 67 percent of all variables in Xt. I again rely on the
IC2 criterion of Bai and Ng (2002) in choosing the number of factors, which suggests four factors.
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Table 2.1: Number of factors selection
Number of factors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Bai and Ng criterion IC2 -0.11 -0.18 -0.23 -0.26 -0.28 -0.27 -0.26
Explained variance in % 26.1 19.5 14.0 10.8 8.4 5.8 4.6
Notes: The upper row shows the Bai and Ng criterion IC2 for dierent numbers of factors. The factors
are the rst principal components of Xt. The lower row shows the variance shares of Xt explained by the
respective factors.
economic indicators and composite price indices outside of China need at least one quarter
to react to Chinese business cycle shocks, while nancial variables and commodity prices
react instantaneously4. To obtain the cleaned estimate Ĥ1t , I estimate equation (2.4) by
ordinary least squares and subtract bcdefl∆cdeflt + bcgdp∆cgdpt from Ĥ0t .
Next, I turn to estimating the actual FAVAR system (2.1)-(2.3). I estimate the loadings
Λ by regressing Xt on F̂t = [Ĥ1
′
t ,∆cgdpt,∆cdeflt]
′. This procedure is valid since the prin-
cipal components of Xt estimate the unobserved common component of Xt n-consistently,
hence I do not face the problem of generated regressors. To examine domestic eects of
Chinese business cycle shocks, I also include key indicators of the Chinese economy as
dependent variables in this regression. The results are presented in section 2.5.1. Subse-
quently, I estimate the VAR system (2.1)-(2.2) by ordinary least squares, which gives me
the reduced form residuals ut and the residual covariance matrix Σ. I follow Eickmeier
(2010) in setting the VAR lag length p = 25.
To identify the structural shocks εt, I impose two theory-based sign restrictions on the
reduced-form shocks ut. First, I orthogonalize them by the inverse of the Cholesky factor of
Σ. Here I order the Chinese variables behind Ĥ1t such that they react contemporaneously to
all variables, whereas Ĥ1t reacts to the Chinese shocks only after one quarter. This ordering
is consistent with the assumptions on the slow-moving variables in Xt in the cleaning
equation (2.4). Since the fast-moving variables are assumed to react instantaneously to
Chinese shocks, I checked if ordering the Chinese variables before Ĥ1t alters my results. It
turned out, however, that this reordering does not play a signicant role. Further details
are described in section 2.5.4. Second, I rotate the two orthogonalized Chinese shocks to
identify an aggregate supply (AS) shock and an aggregate demand (AD) shock in China.
The identication of the shocks rests upon sign restrictions imposed on the impulse response
prole of the Chinese indicators. The restriction scheme is the following: the AD shock is
dened as a shock that drives Chinese GDP growth and ination in the same direction.
4Although these assumptions are widely accepted in the literature (see, e.g., Bernanke et al., 2005 and
Cesa-Bianchi, 2013), I tested dierent classications of the variables as slow-moving and fast-moving
and checked the robustness of my results. As it turns out, the results are not signicantly aected and my
conclusions remain intact.
5Whereas the BIC and the HQ point to p = 1 the AIC suggests p = 3. To check if my results hinge on
a higher lag order I re-estimate the model with p = 3. It turns out, however, that my conclusions are not
aected. Details are presented in section 2.5.4.
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The AS shock, by contrast, is a shock that drives the same variables in opposite directions6.
These assumptions are consistent with a large number of theoretical models such as the
IS-LM model or New-Keynesian models à la Smets and Wouters (2003) and have often
been applied in the empirical literature (e.g., Peersman, 2005 and Eickmeier, 2010).
I implement the restrictions by means of a k-dimensional identity matrix R whose
lower-right 2 × 2 submatrix is replaced by a Given's rotation matrix. Hence, R has the
property R′R = R−1R = Ik. Using the denition A
−1
0 = chol(Σ)R in equation (2.1), I
obtain the structural shocks εt as follows:
ut = A
−1
0 εt (2.5)
⇔ εt = R′chol(Σ)−1ut (2.6)
I choose the angle of R by randomly drawing candidates from a domain between 0 and
2π. In case the sign restrictions described above are met, I keep the draw and otherwise
discard it. I stop the search once I have collected 200 accepted angles.
This identication has the clear disadvantage that the 200 accepted angles imply 200
observationally equivalent but dierent and possibly conictive models. To circumvent this
problem and nd a representative model, I follow the Median Target Approach by Fry,
Pagan, et al. (2007): I compute the impulse response functions implied by all 200 accepted
angles and choose the one that minimizes the squared distance from the median impulse
responses.
2.5 Results
In this section, I present key results implied by the FAVAR. First, I perform an impulse
response analysis to learn about the domestic and international eects of the Chinese struc-
tural shocks. Then I show the estimated shock series to depict the Chinese business cycle
of the last decade in terms of AS and AD innovations. Finally, I assess the international
eects of these innovations from 2012 onward using historical decompositions of ination
and interest rates outside of China.
2.5.1 Impulse response functions
Figure 2.3 shows cumulative median impulse responses of Chinese GDP growth and ina-
tion to a positive AS shock and a positive AD shock. Both shocks are scaled such that
Chinese GDP growth increases on impact by one standard deviation, which is 0.6 percent.
To account for measurement uncertainty, I add 68 and 95 percent condence intervals
to the median impulse responses resulting from the bootstrap-after-bootstrap method of
Kilian (1998). I set the number of bootstrap replications to 1000. Since n >> T the
uncertainty associated with the factor estimation can be neglected, as shown by Bai, Ng,
et al. (2006).
6The time horizon for which the sign restrictions are imposed on the impulse response functions is set
to four quarters. Hence, after that period the impulse responses are unrestricted. I tried dierent horizons
but the estimation results did not signicantly change.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse response functions - Chinese indicators
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Notes: The panels show cumulative impulse response functions of economic indicators to a Chinese AD
shock and an AS shock, displayed in percentages. Both shocks are scaled such that Chinese GDP growth
increases on impact by one standard deviation (0.6 percent). The impulse responses are constructed using
the Median Target Approach suggested by Fry, Pagan, et al. (2007). The dashed graphs are 68 and
95 percent condence intervals resulting from the bootstrap-after-bootstrap method proposed by Kilian
(1998) and 1000 re-estimations.
As expected, the AS shock drives GDP and prices in China in opposite directions. It
increases GDP by 0.6 percent on impact and by 1.3 percent in the long run, and it lowers
the GDP deator by up to 0.8 percent. The AD shock, by contrast, drives GDP and prices
in the same direction. GDP again increases by 0.6 percent on impact and slowly fades out
afterwards. Prices react more sluggishly to the AD shock than to the AS shock: The GDP
deator appreciates by 0.8 percent on impact and reaches its maximum of 2.9 percent only
six quarters after the shock.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show how global oil, commodity, and steel prices and national price
indicators outside of China react to the Chinese shocks. As national reference measures I
use consumer and producer prices (CPI and PPI). Since it is impossible to comment on the
impulse response functions of all 41 countries in the dataset I compute weighted averages
over countries for Asia (Japan and South Korea), the eleven original Euro Area countries,
eight non-Euro countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the UK), and Oceania (Australia and New Zealand). The weights are
based on the country shares in the group-specic nominal GDP aggregates.
The gures show that the impulse response functions have qualitatively similar features
across price categories and country groups. Most impulse responses are close to zero
or insignicant at small horizons, which implies that international spillovers of Chinese
business cycle shocks are sluggish. They reach their maximum after approximately four
quarters and become insignicant again at large horizons. Hence, the Chinese shocks do
not have long-run eects on international prices.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse response functions - Global price indicators
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Notes: See gure 2.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
The gures also show that the AS shock tends to have a lowering on-impact eect on
prices outside of China, which either fades out or turns slightly positive after approximately
one year. This nding might be the result of two countervailing mechanisms: By denition,
a positive AS shock lowers ination but raises real activity in China. Through international
price competition this should also lower prices outside of China. However, if higher real
activity comes along with higher demand for commodities and thus raises their prices, the
net eect of the AS shock is unclear.
By contrast, the AD shock has a considerable and signicantly positive eect on global
prices. The eects are particularly large for oil, commodity, and steel prices, which respec-
tively increase by ten, three, and eight percent. Hence, globally traded raw materials are
important transmission channels of Chinese demand shocks. We also see that the national
PPIs react considerably stronger to a Chinese AD shock than the CPIs, a nding which is
in line with Eickmeier and Kühnlenz (2016). Overall, the eect is most pronounced in the
US, where the PPI increases by three percent in response to a Chinese AD shock. In Asia,
the Euro Area, the non-Euro countries, and Oceania the eects are also non-negligible and
amount to 2.3, 1.4, 2.0, and 1.3 percent, respectively. The greater importance of external
shocks for the PPIs might be explainable by the fact that the PPI contains more tradeable
and manufactured goods than the CPI. Furthermore, Bacchetta and Wincoop (2003) show
that if domestic rms import intermediate goods priced in foreign currency and sell nal
goods in domestic currency, the pass-through of external shocks to the CPI is incomplete.
60 Chapter 2. China's Economic Slowdown and International Ination Dynamics
Figure 2.5: Impulse response functions - National price indicators outside
of China
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Notes: See gure 2.3 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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2.5.2 Structural shock estimates
Figure 2.6 displays 3-quarter averages of the estimated Chinese AS and AD shock series.
The series indicate for each point in time whether the shocks are expansive or contrac-
tionary and which magnitude they have.
The Great Recession that aected China already in 2008 is preceded by positive AS
and AD shocks from 2006 until the beginning of 2008. The shock sizes in 2008 and 2009
are rather moderate, which is expected since the Great Recession is largely explained by
the international component Ht. The recovery of 2010, however, also shows up as positive
demand innovations in China.
Afterwards, we observe a further expansion in demand in 2012 and 2013, followed by
a sharp downturn from mid-2014 until 2015Q1. The AD component then recovers slightly
in 2015 and 2016 and turns positive again in 2017. The AS component persistently stays
at low levels after the Great Recession and turns positive only in mid-2011. After an
expansive period until the end of 2014, it becomes contractionary again and remains so
until the end of the sample.
To sum up, China's cyclical downturn from 2012 until 2015 can be attributed to a
mixture of negative AS and AD shocks. The further fall in real activity and the trend
reversal in the ination rate in 2016 and 2017 is mainly due to negative AS shocks.
Figure 2.6: Structural shocks
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Notes: The panels show 3-quarter averages of the estimated Chinese AS and AD shocks.
2.5.3 Historical decompositions
In this section, I quantify the global inuence of the Chinese shocks on ination and interest
rates after 2012. The gures 2.7 and 2.8 show historical decompositions of several ination
indicators. Each panel shows the realized ination rate (red) and a hypothetical rate (blue)
that results from a counterfactual analysis. In that counterfactual analysis, I maintain the
idiosyncratic and common shocks in the FAVAR but shut down one of the two Chinese
shocks or both shocks. Hence, the dierence between the realized and the hypothetical
rates indicates how relevant China's inuence was for global ination. To examine the
nancial implications, I perform the same historical decompositions for interest rates (see
Figure 2.10). As region-specic aggregate measures I again take the weighted averages of
the national indicators.
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2.5.3.1 Ination
The Figures 2.7 and 2.8 indicate a non-negligible impact of the Chinese business cycle on
global ination dynamics during the last decade. The hypothetical ination rates without
the inuence of one of the two Chinese shocks are to a moderate but signicant degree
dierent from the realized rates. The same holds for the hypothetical rates where both
shocks are shut down at a time.
Figure 2.7 shows that after 2014, the Chinese shocks tended to lower global oil, com-
modity, and steel prices since the hypothetical ination rates are higher than the realized
rates. Before 2014, the Chinese shocks had negligible or even positive eects since the
hypothetical rates are lower than the realized rates. This nding again conrms that
commodity prices are important transmission channels of Chinese business cycle shocks.
Figure 2.7: Historical decompositions - Global ination indicators
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implied by the FAVAR (blue). The hypothetical rates in the upper two rows result from a counterfactual
analysis in which one Chinese shock is shut down and all other shocks are maintained. The hypothetical
rates in the bottom row result from shutting down both Chinese shocks and maintaining all other shocks.
The ination rates are displayed in percentages.
If we look at national CPI and PPI ination outside of China, displayed in Figure 2.8,
the results are similar. Until 2014, the eects of the Chinese shocks are ambiguous or
economically insignicant. After 2014, the negative AS and AD shocks take eect and
markedly lower ination rates in all country groups. The results conrm the ndings from
section 2.5.1: rst, the eects are most pronounced in the US. Second, AD shocks have
slightly larger eects than AS shocks, and third, the PPIs react stronger to both Chinese
shocks than the CPIs. Between 2014Q1 and 2017Q4, the realized quarterly PPI ination
rates in Asia, the Euro Area, the non-Euro countries, Oceania, and the US were on average
0.16, 0.18, 0.16, 0.19, and 0.33 percentage points lower than the hypothetical rates without
the two Chinese shocks. These numbers are considerable given that the standard deviations
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Figure 2.8: Historical decompositions - National ination indicators out-
side of China
(a) CPI ination
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ation
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See gure 2.7 for a detailed description of the graphs.
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of the quarterly PPI ination rates over the entire sample are 0.99, 1.04, 1.17, 1.33, and
1.74 percent, respectively. In terms of CPI ination rates the dierences are slightly smaller
in the same period. The realized CPI ination rates were on average 0.01, 0.06, 0.06, 0.06,
and 0.10 percentage points lower than the hypothetical rates in Asia, the Euro Area, the
non-Euro-Area countries, Oceania, and the US, respectively. The country group-specic
standard deviations of CPI ination amount to 0.34, 0.29, 0.32, 0.34, and 0.53 percent.
These eects are clearly linked to the positive AD shocks in 2012 and 2013 and the
negative AD shocks in 2014 and 2015. It is striking that the Chinese inuence on interna-
tional prices was particularly signicant in the second half of 2015, hence about one year
after the period of large negative AD shocks from 2014Q2 until 2015Q1. This time lag is
due to the sluggishness of the international eects that I found in section 2.5.1.
To assess the cumulative eect of the Chinese shocks, I also compute price levels im-
plied by the historical decompositions. Figure 2.9 displays the price levels implied by the
hypothetical ination rates that include all shocks but the two Chinese in the FAVAR. Be-
sides, it shows the realized price levels. I normalize all prices in 2014Q1 to an index value
of 1007. Table 2.2 additionally reports the gaps between the realized and the hypothetical
prices in 2015Q4, 2016Q4, and 2017Q4.
The results show that in the rst half of 2014, China's global inuence on prices was
still small. Afterwards, however, the contractionary Chinese shocks become increasingly
visible since realized and hypothetical prices start to diverge. The eect on the price of
raw materials is especially pronounced: In terms of steel prices it amounted to -8.3 percent
already in 2015Q4. The national price indicators reacted a bit later but still noticeably. In
the US, for example, the CPI and the PPI fell by up to 1.8 and 5.7 percent in response to
the Chinese shocks, respectively. In the Euro Area and Asia, China's inuence was strong
enough to turn (hypothetically) positive dynamics of the PPI into negative. Whereas the
realized PPI in these regions dropped by 0.7 and 1.0 percent, the counterfactual PPIs
without the Chinese shocks would have increased by 2.5 and 1.2 percent, respectively.
2.5.3.2 Interest rates
In this section, I examine to which degree the Chinese shocks spilled over to interest rates
outside of China. Similarly like ination rates, interest rates experienced a pronounced and
persistent decline after the Great Recession. While parts of this decline can be explained
by a lower real interest rate (Holston et al., 2017), monetary policy rules and the Fisher
eect create a direct link to domestic ination (Taylor, 1999; Clarida et al., 1999; Mishkin,
1992). Moreover, since the ndings from sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.3.1 suggest a signicant
contribution of Chinese shocks to the global downturn in ination rates, I conclude that
these shocks should also have lowered interest rates internationally.
I conduct the same historical decomposition of interest rates as in the case of ination
rates. Figure 2.10 displays 10-year government bond rates in the considered regions and
7I choose this date as base period because in 2014Q2 the Chinese AD shock fell sharply below zero,
reaching its lowest level in 2015Q1. Furthermore, in 2014 at the latest the Chinese shocks started to
markedly lower ination rates outside of China, as the gures 2.7 and 2.8 show.
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Figure 2.9: Cumulative eects of Chinese shocks on prices outside of
China
(a) Global price indicators
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Notes: Each panel shows the realized price level (red) and the price level implied by a hypothetical quarterly
ination rate (blue). The hypothetical ination rate results from a counterfactual analysis in which both
Chinese shocks are shut down and all other shocks in the FAVAR are maintained. The price levels are
normalized to 100 in the base period 2014Q1.
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Table 2.2: Cumulative eects of Chinese shocks on prices outside of China
Global prices Oil prices Commodity prices Steel prices
2015Q4 -8.7 -3.2 -8.3
2016Q4 -10.7 -4.0 -8.5
2017Q4 -12.4 -4.4 -7.2
National prices Asia Euro Area Non-Euro Oceania US
CPI
2015Q4 -0.06 -0.39 -0.26 -0.51 -0.85
2016Q4 -0.12 -0.72 -0.61 -1.08 -1.40
2017Q4 -0.17 -1.08 -1.17 -1.69 -1.77
PPI
2015Q4 -1.23 -1.79 -1.11 -1.58 -3.24
2016Q4 -1.82 -2.71 -1.79 -3.18 -4.96
2017Q4 -2.21 -3.30 -2.66 -4.12 -5.70
Notes: The table displays the dierence between the realized price level and the price level implied by a
hypothetical quarterly ination rate. The hypothetical ination rate results from a counterfactual analysis
in which both Chinese shocks are shut down and all other shocks in the FAVAR are maintained. The price
levels are normalized to 100 in the base period 2014Q1.
their respective counterfactuals without the inuence of the two Chinese shocks8. The
comparison between both series shows that the Chinese business cycle noticeably aected
long-term interest rates outside of China. Between 2012 and 2017, the average absolute
deviation between the realized interest rate and the hypothetical rate amounted to 12, 13,
14, 18, and 12 basis points in Asia, the Euro Area, the non-Euro countries, Oceania, and
the US, respectively. From 2013Q1 until 2015Q1, the realized rates tended to be higher
than the hypothetical rates, which implies a positive eect of the Chinese shocks during
this time. After 2015Q1, the eect becomes negative. This reversal follows the qualitative
turn of the Chinese AD shock from positive to negative in 2014Q2 and is consistent with
the eects on ination described in section 2.5.3.1. The lowering impact is most visible in
the last observations. In the Euro Area, for instance, the dierence between the realized
10-year rate and the counterfactual without the Chinese inuence amounted to 28 basis
points in 2017Q4.
To sum up, China's cyclic downturn also spilled over to interest rates and thus the
nancial sector outside of China. In particular, it reinforced the decline in nancial yields
during the last decade, resulting in a signicant reduction at the current edge.
8I conducted the same analysis using interest rates with shorter maturity (e.g., 3-month rates) but did
not nd signicantly dierent results.
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Figure 2.10: Historical decompositions - National interest rates outside
of China
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Notes: Each panel shows the realized 10-year government bond rate (red) and a hypothetical rate that is
implied by the FAVAR (blue). The hypothetical rates in the upper two rows result from a counterfactual
analysis in which one Chinese shock is shut down and all other shocks are maintained. The hypothetical
rates in the bottom row result from shutting down both Chinese shocks and maintaining all other shocks.
The rates are displayed in percentages.
2.5.4 Robustness checks
As customary in empirical papers, I perform several sensitivity checks to strengthen the
credibility of my results. In the following subsections, I present results from modifying
a single property of the baseline FAVAR and re-estimating it. In every modication the
respective other estimation settings remain unchanged. I check the sensitivity of the base-
line setup by comparing the cumulative eects of the Chinese shocks on global ination in
2016Q4. All results are reported in Table 2.3.
Ordering of variables
To orthogonalize the VAR residuals in the baseline setup, I set the Chinese variables below
the international factors. Hence, I assume that the international factors react to shocks
from China only with a delay of one quarter whereas the Chinese variables immediately
react to international shocks. In a rst experiment, I check if this ordering plays a role for
my results and conclusions. I estimate a version of the FAVAR in which I set the Chinese
variables above the international factors and again compute the cumulative eects of the
Chinese shocks on international prices. The results are reported in the second row of Table
2.3, together with the baseline results. As it turns out, the new ordering leads to higher
cumulative eects of the Chinese shocks on prices outside of China. These ndings are
not unexpected since the alternative ordering allows international factors to react to the
shocks on impact. As a result, my conclusion that China's economic slowdown has lowered
prices globally is conrmed.
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Detrending
As the data showed, the slowdown in China's economic performance markedly contrasts
with the very high and stable growth rates before the Great Recession. The stark dierence
between both periods raises the question whether not only China's business cycle has slowed
down but also its long-term potential growth. If this is the case, however, the Chinese
series need to be cleaned by a time-varying trend prior to using them in the FAVAR. Up to
this point, I only adjusted the growth rates by their means, implicitly assuming constant
potential growth.
To allow for a secular growth trend, I apply the local-level model suggested by Stock
and Watson (2005) to the Chinese GDP growth rate and the ination rate. The model
yields a smooth time-varying trend for both series, which I subtract from these. Then I
plug the detrended series into the FAVAR and carry out the estimation as described. The
estimated trend is shown jointly with the other series in the FAVAR in Figure B.1.
The eects of the Chinese shocks under this modication are presented in row two of
Table 2.3. As it turns out, they are barely distinguishable from the baseline results, which
suggests that time-variation in the growth trend does not play a role in this paper.
Long-run restrictions
In section 2.4, I described and justied the identication of AD and AS shocks in China
by means of short-run sign restrictions. To check if my results hinge on this scheme, I
apply long-run restrictions to identify both shocks. Blanchard and Quah (1989) introduced
this method relying on the idea that AD shocks should have no long-run eects on real
economic activity. I follow their assumption and impose on the Chinese AD shock that it
does not aect Chinese GDP in the long run. By contrast, the eect of the AS shock is left
unrestricted. The estimated impact of both shocks on international prices are displayed
in row four of Table 2.3. They are slightly smaller in absolute values but still very similar
to those of the baseline setup. I conclude from this that the identication of structural
shocks plays a subordinate role in my conclusions.
Control for oil prices
Here I address the argument that oil market developments might not be suciently ac-
counted for in the model, especially during the sharp decline in oil prices in 2014. Between
June and December of that year, the Brent oil price dropped by 44 percent of its original
value. According to Baumeister and Kilian (2016), half of this decline can be attributed to
a fall in global aggregate demand, whereas one third was due to oil supply shocks. Since
oil supply shocks should have opposite eects on GDP and ination, I need to rule out the
risk that they are confused with Chinese AS shocks. To control for oil supply shocks, I
replace the factor space by Ft = [Ĥ ′t, ∆cgdpt, ∆cdeflt, ∆oilpt]
′ where oilpt denotes
the real price of crude oil, and re-estimate the model. The fact that oil prices are ordered
last follows the assumption that they are fast-moving and is consistent with the discussion
in section 2.4.
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The estimation results under this setup are reported in the fth row of Table 2.3. It
turns out that controlling for oil price shocks slightly increases the eect of China's growth
slowdown on global ination. This nding is to a considerable degree due to the third and
fourth quarters of 2014, hence the period in which the oil price drop occurred. However,
the total eects are still comparable to those in the baseline setup and therefore do not
aect my conclusions.
Table 2.3: Robustness checks
Modication Asia Euro Area Non-Euro Oceania US
(excl. China) Area
CPI
1. Baseline -0.12 -0.72 -0.61 -1.08 -1.40
2. Ordering of variables -0.09 -1.45 -2.03 -1.80 -1.54
3. Detrending -0.08 -0.70 -0.56 -1.06 -1.41
4. Long-run restrictions -0.10 -0.67 -0.55 -1.02 -1.35
5. Control for oil prices -0.12 -1.26 -1.14 -1.61 -2.17
6. Control for Euro crisis -0.13 -0.63 -0.53 -0.99 -1.27
7. Regional factors -0.06 -0.80 -0.84 -1.00 -1.21
8. Value-added -0.10 -0.65 -0.52 -1.05 -1.41
9. VAR(3) -0.40 -1.06 -1.08 -0.93 -1.55
PPI
1. Baseline -1.82 -2.71 -1.79 -3.18 -4.96
2. Ordering of variables -1.64 -3.44 -3.74 -2.36 -3.48
3. Detrending -1.69 -2.60 -1.65 -3.06 -4.92
4. Long-run restrictions -1.74 -2.58 -1.67 -3.04 -4.83
5. Control for oil prices -2.87 -3.86 -3.17 -4.03 -7.63
6. Control for Euro crisis -1.69 -2.43 -1.61 -2.97 -4.55
7. Regional factors -1.51 -2.67 -2.02 -1.68 -4.52
8. Value-added -1.69 -2.44 -1.70 -3.00 -4.97
9. VAR(3) -2.34 -4.49 -6.31 -2.01 -5.07
Notes: The table displays the dierence between the realized price level and the price level implied by a hy-
pothetical quarterly ination rate in 2016Q4. The hypothetical ination rate results from a counterfactual
analysis in which both Chinese shocks are shut down and all other shocks in the FAVAR are maintained.
The price levels are normalized to 100 in the base period 2014Q1.
Control for the Euro crisis
I also address the possibility that the global factors Ĥt do not suciently control for
the Euro crisis, which kicked in between 2012 and 2013 in terms of Euro Area GDP
and thus overlapped with China's economic slowdown. To account for this issue, I add
Italian real GDP growth (∆itagdpt) as a slow-moving variable to the factor space such that
Ft = [Ĥ
′
t, ∆itagdpt, ∆cgdpt, ∆cdeflt]
′, and re-estimate the model then. I choose
Italian GDP growth for two reasons: First, Italy is the third-largest economy of the Euro
zone. Second, Italy was severely and persistently aected by the crisis: National GDP
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growth was -2.8 percent in 2012 and -1.7 percent in 2013. It turns out, however, that
re-running the estimation based on this specication yields only negligible changes (see
row six of Table 2.3).
Regional factors
It is a popular narrative in the literature that regional factors are important drivers of
the international business cycle (see, e.g., Artis and Zhang, 1999 and Stock and Wat-
son, 2005). To account for this issue, I modify my model setup as follows: I estimate
a total of ten regional factors, namely four for North America and Europe and two
for Asia (excluding China). The factors are estimated by extracting principal compo-
nents from the region-specic subsamples of Xt9. Then I set up the factor space Ft =
[ĤEU
′
t Ĥ
NA′
t Ĥ
AS′
t ∆cgdpt ∆cdeflt]
′ and re-estimate the FAVAR. I tried dierent
orderings of the regional factors, but the results were barely distinguishable from those
presented here. The cumulative eects of the Chinese shocks in the historical decomposi-
tion are reported in row seven of Table 2.3. Again, except for a few cases, the numbers are
very similar to those of the baseline estimation.
Measuring real activity
Since the quality of Chinese data is often subject to criticism, I check if using Chinese
value-added instead of real GDP in the FAVAR yields dierent results. I again rely on
the data constructed by Chang et al. (2016), which matches the series published by the
World Bank. The growth rate of value-added is generally very similar to GDP growth
but slightly diers in 2016 and 2017. In 2016, GDP growth amounted to 5.4 percent, but
value-added grew by 6.5 percent. In 2017, GDP growth added up to 4.5 percent, while
the growth rate of value added was 6.6 percent. However, if I take value-added in the
FAVAR I obtain cumulative eects of the Chinese shocks that are very similar to those of
the baseline setup. The results are reported in row eight of Table 2.3.
Lag order
Finally, I check if a higher lag order in the VAR changes my results. I re-estimate the model
with p = 3, as suggested by the AIC. However, I nd that both the impulse responses and
the structural shock series are very similar to those of baseline setup with p = 2. The
same holds for the cumulative eects of the Chinese shocks on global ination, which are
reported in row nine of Table 2.3. As it turns out, they are slightly larger in absolute
values than those of the baseline setup. Hence, my conclusions remain intact.
2.6 Conclusion
I t a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model to a large-dimensional macroeconomic
data set covering 41 countries over the period 2000-2017 to examine the impact of China's
9The number of factors is determined by the IC2 criterion by Bai and Ng (2002). I cleaned the regional
factors from the Chinese component using the procedure described in section 2.4.
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economic downturn on ination outside of China. I identify and estimate Chinese AS
and AD innovations and compute impulse responses of global price indicators and national
prices in the US, Europe, Asia, and Oceania in response to these innovations. Furthermore,
I compute historical decompositions to identify the Chinese economic slowdown in terms
of structural shocks and assess their contributions to international ination dynamics.
My main ndings are the following: (i) Business cycle shocks and especially AD shocks
in China signicantly spill over to national ination rates in the US, Europe, Asia, and
Oceania and are transmitted by global oil, commodity, and steel prices. (ii) The slowdown
in the Chinese business cycle after the Great Recession can be attributed to a combination
of contractionary AS and AD shocks in China. (iii) From 2014 onward, these shocks had
a lowering eect on quarterly PPI ination rates outside of China of up to 0.3 percentage
points. They cumulatively lowered global oil prices by twelve percent and national PPIs
outside of China by up to six percent. Hence, the Chinese business cycle noticeably con-
tributed to the worldwide decline in ination rates and hampered the recent upward trend.
(iv) Adverse Chinese shocks also spilled over to interest rates and hence the nancial sector
outside of China, resulting in a lowering impact on the current level of yields.
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Abstract
The literature has widely discussed the role of nancial and uncertainty shocks for the
macroeconomy. However, it has turned out to be dicult to isolate these shocks from
nancial market indicators and uncertainty proxies because any identifying restriction on
their response prole requires strong assumptions. To obtain more robust results, I model
nancial and uncertainty shocks jointly in a state-dependent FAVAR setup for the U.S.
and provide agnostic identication bounds on their eects. I document that (i) uncertainty
shocks are of limited relevance for real activity and asset prices in boom periods but
have contractionary eects in recessions. (ii) By comparison, adverse nancial shocks
are contractionary in both states of the economy. (iii) Identifying assumptions play a
signicant role in recessions, reected by wide identication bounds on the macroeconomic
eects. (iv) Financial shocks exhibit tighter bounds than uncertainty shocks considering
the impact on asset prices, hence the impact can be determined more precisely.
Keywords: Macroeconomic tail events, nonlinear FAVARs, nancial shocks
JEL classication: E32, E37, E44
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3.1 Introduction
The unprecedented disruptions of the Great Recession, its depth and duration have led
to the question of whether traditional sources of business cycle uctuations are sucient
in times of economic stress. Therefore, more recently theorists and empiricists have in-
creasingly focused on the role of uncertainty and nancial conditions and, in particular,
the interplay between both (Bachmann et al., 2013; Bloom, 2009; Curdia and Woodford,
2010; Ajello, 2016). There is strong evidence that periods of elevated nancial stress are
associated with higher volatility in economic indicators, and the combination of these fac-
tors leads to signicant real eects. Caldara et al. (2016), for instance, nd that the Great
Recession was likely a result of the toxic interaction between uncertainty and nancial
shocks. Alessandri and Mumtaz (2018) moreover document that the impact of exogenous
increases in uncertainty is six times larger during times of nancial stress.
The connection between nancial indicators and uncertainty suggests that it is essential
to model them jointly to separate autonomous changes from endogenous reactions. Indeed,
parts of the literature question uncertainty as an exogenous driver of the business cycle
but instead emphasize its endogeneity to nancial and other disturbances. For example,
Ludvigson et al. (2015) nd that sharply higher macroeconomic uncertainty in recessions is
often an endogenous response to output shocks, while shocks that originate in the nancial
market are a likely source of output uctuations. As a result, exogenous disturbances
in macroeconomic uncertainty play a minor role once nancial shocks are controlled for
(Popescu and Smets, 2010).
However, the empirical isolation of uncertainty shocks from nancial shocks is dicult,
as Stock and Watson (2012) show in their analysis of the channels of the Great Reces-
sion. Under the nonexistence of valid instruments we need identifying restrictions on the
shocks' response prole, and these are typically strong. To give an example, nancial
and uncertainty indicators are assumed to react to each other on impact, which precludes
plausible contemporaneous zero restrictions in an SVAR setup. Popescu and Smets (2010)
accordingly document that the coexistence of both indicators raises identication issues if
a recursive ordering is used.
In this paper, I use a set identication scheme based on the penalty function approach
of Uhlig (2005) to estimate the impact of nancial and uncertainty shocks on real economic
activity and asset prices in the United States. I apply the identication to a state-dependent
factor-augmented VAR model in which I include a large panel of macroeconomic and
nancial indicators. To measure uncertainty, I use a set of proxies capturing dierent
categories, namely macroeconomic, nancial, and economic policy uncertainty. As an
indicator of nancial stress I use the excess bond premium introduced by Gilchrist and
Zakraj²ek (2012).
I contribute in several ways to the literature. First, the penalty function approach yields
identication bounds on the eects of uncertainty and nancial shocks that reect views
stressing uncertainty as an exogenous source of business cycle uctuations (e.g., Bachmann
et al., 2013 and Bloom, 2009) as well as conservative views (e.g., Popescu and Smets, 2010
and Ludvigson et al., 2015). The bounds are constructed by dening a large and a small
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version of both shocks. The large uncertainty shock is dened as an innovation that induces
the maximal increase in a given uncertainty proxy. By the same token, the large nancial
shock is characterized as an innovation which yields the largest possible increase in the
excess bond premium. I dene the small uncertainty shock as the empirical residual of
the uncertainty indicator that is not explained by the large nancial shock. The analogous
denition applies to the small nancial shock. As it will turn out, the large versions of both
shocks yield a sharper macroeconomic contraction than the small versions and thus the
lower bound of the corridor of possible impacts. The small versions consequently generate
the upper bound.
Second, the identication bounds indicate how nancial disturbances and uncertainty
innovations are transferred to the business cycle. Following the view of Bloom (2009),
uncertainty has real implications since investment projects are partially irreversible. This
means that when business conditions are uncertain, entrepreneurs defer real capital ex-
penditures or recruiting until the outlook becomes clearer, a behavior that is commonly
referred to as wait-and-see business cycles (Bachmann et al., 2013). These real option
eects serve as explanation for both versions of the uncertainty shock since each of them
induces an increase in uncertainty proxies. However, since the large uncertainty shock
produces a rise in the excess bond premium it also echoes the nancial perspective shaped
by Gilchrist et al. (2014), Christiano et al. (2014), and Alessandri and Mumtaz (2018).
The narrative here is that uncertainty shocks raise risk premia on external nance and
thus marginal costs, which results in lower real activity.
Third, I distinguish between recessions and boom periods in the empirical framework
and hence provide further evidence on the state-dependence of uncertainty and nancial
shocks. Besides, I account for the proposition that both these shocks were a major driving
force of the Great Recession (e.g., Stock and Watson, 2012 and Caldara et al., 2016). To
my knowledge, there are no other contributions that address their role in a joint setup and
distinguish between recessions and boom periods at the same time.
My ndings can be summarized as follows: Exogenous increases in uncertainty have a
highly state-dependent inuence on real activity and asset prices. While they are of limited
signicance in boom periods, they have contractionary eects in recessions. However,
identifying assumptions play a non-negligible role for the eect sizes since the identication
bounds are generally wide. This implies that the impact of uncertainty shocks cannot
be precisely determined and is potentially small if nancial shocks are simultaneously
accounted for. By comparison, nancial shocks have relatively tight bounds, albeit only
in terms of their impact on asset prices. The bandwidths of the possible eects on real
activity are considerable for both shocks. Hence, the interaction between uncertainty and
nancial conditions plays a pivotal role in the shock transmissions.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 describe the model setup
and the estimation approach. Section 3.4 presents the data and their transformations.
In section 3.5, I discuss impulse responses and forecast error variance decompositions of
macroeconomic indicators in response to nancial and uncertainty shocks and a robustness
analysis. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Empirical setup
As empirical framework I employ a state-dependent version of the factor-augmented vector
autoregressive (FAVAR) model for the United States. I augment a VAR of a nancial
indicator and an uncertainty proxy by a limited number of latent but estimable factors.
This approach has two advantages: rst, it circumvents the curse of dimensionality if a
large panel of economic variables is of interest by reducing the panel to a small set of
common factors. Hence, I do not need to restrict the variables entering the analysis to a
few key measures. Second, the common factors concentrate a broad set of real, nancial,
and price indicators and are consequently informative enough to serve as business cycle
controls (Bernanke et al., 2005 and Forni and Gambetti, 2010). To account for state-
dependence in the FAVAR, I distinguish between a recessionary and a non-recessionary
state (which I henceforth refer to as boom state). The states are identied by the recession
chronology of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
3.2.1 State-dependent FAVAR
The starting point of the state-dependent FAVAR is a recession indicator Rt, dened as
Rt =
1 if period t is an NBER recession0 otherwise.
Rt assigns an n × 1-dimensional vector Xt of n = 101 macroeconomic variables for the
United States either a recession or a boom subsample. Both subsamples are assumed to
follow a factor structure, thus each Xi,t, i = 1, . . . , n is driven by a common component
and an idiosyncratic component. The state-specic observation equation of the FAVAR is
accordingly given by
Xt = Λ
′
RtYt + ξt (3.1)
where Λ′RtYt represents the common component and ξt ∼ N(0,ΩRt) the idiosyncratic com-
ponent with diagonal covariance matrix ΩRt = Var(ξt) = diag(ω
2
1,Rt
, . . . , ω2n,Rt). The term
ΛRt = [Λ1,Rt , . . . ,Λn,Rt ] denotes the loading matrix and ω
2
i,Rt
, i = 1, . . . , n the variance
of the idiosyncratic component of Xi,t. Yt = [F ′t , EBPt, UNt]
′ is k × 1 and contains a
set of m latent but estimable factors Ft = [F1,t, . . . , Fm,t]′ and a nance-uncertainty bloc
consisting of two observable variables, namely the excess bond premium EBPt and a proxy
for economic uncertainty UNt. In section 3.4, I describe further details on the indicators
in the nance-uncertainty bloc and the series in Xt1.
1The indicators in the nance-uncertainty bloc are mean adjusted for the purpose of estimation. The
series in Xt are additionally standardized. The identication of the latent factors Ft follows the scheme
suggested by Bernanke et al. (2005): in case ofm factors the rstm variables in Xt have identity as loading
matrix. In addition, I set their loadings on the nance-uncertainty bloc to zero. Since the factors only
serve as control variables in my analysis, I refrain from using any rotations on top of the just-identication.
However, I impose further zero restrictions on the loadings of slow-moving variables in Xt on the nance-
uncertainty bloc. I assume that variables such as industrial production, employment, and price indices do
not instantaneously react to nancial or uncertainty shocks but adjust with a delay of at least one month
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The dynamic relationship between the nance-uncertainty bloc and Ft follows a struc-
tural VAR, which forms the transition equation of the FAVAR:
Yt =
p∑
k=1
BRt,kYt−k + ut (3.2)
ut = PRt,jεt (3.3)
p denotes the lag order, ut ∼ N(0,ΣRt) the vector of reduced-form residuals and εt ∼
N(0, Ik) the structural shocks. The matrix PRt,j with property PRt,jP
′
Rt,j
= ΣRt describes
the contemporaneous relationship between the reduced-form residuals and the structural
shocks of interest, namely the uncertainty shock and the nancial shock, under identica-
tion scheme j. The identifying restrictions are discussed in the following.
To isolate the nance-uncertainty bloc as a whole from the latent factors Ft, I initially
assume a recursive chain. Hence, the EBP can react instantaneously to the latent factors
but not vice versa, a scheme that mimics Bernanke et al. (2005) and Forni and Gambetti
(2010). I follow Popescu and Smets (2010) and Jurado et al. (2015) in setting uncertainty
below the latent factors, relying on the assumption that uncertainty shocks should not
aect the business cycle on impact because of various information or decision lags.
3.2.2 The penalty function approach
The isolation of nancial shocks from uncertainty shocks and thus the determination of
PRt,j is a key issue of my contribution. I refrain from using contemporaneous zero re-
strictions since the EBP and the uncertainty proxy are assumed to react to each other on
impact. I instead employ a version of the penalty function approach (PFA) proposed by Uh-
lig (2005) and Caldara et al. (2016), which leaves the mutual impact responses of the EBP
and the uncertainty proxy unrestricted. In brief, the PFA selects a structural (FA)VAR
shock that maximizes a criterion function subject to inequality constraints. Uhlig (2005),
for example, isolates a monetary policy shock by maximizing the shock's contribution to
the forecast error variance of the federal funds rate2.
In this paper, the criterion function consists of the sum of impulse response functions
(IRFs) of selected variables from horizon 0 to h, while the inequality constraints correspond
to sign restrictions on these IRFs. Using this design of the PFA, I choose two dierent iden-
tication schemes j = 1, 2, labeled as EBP-max and UN-max scheme. The EBP-max
scheme denes the nancial shock as the one which maximizes the h-step cumulative IRF
of the EBP. I henceforth call it the large nancial shock because it has a maximal eect
on the EBP. The UN-max scheme denes the uncertainty shock as the one which maxi-
mizes the h-step cumulative IRF of the uncertainty proxy. I call it the large uncertainty
shock.
through the factors. Accordingly, the loadings of fast-moving variables such as asset prices, interest rates,
and the money supply are left unrestricted.
2My version of the PFA and that of Caldara et al. (2016) slightly diers from that of Uhlig (2005).
Instead of maximizing the forecast error variance of a target variable in response to a specic structural
shock, I maximize the cumulative IRF. This approach has the advantage that it prevents the target variable
from switching signs over the forecast horizon.
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To implement these assumptions, I dene the impact matrix PRt,j as follows:
PRt,j = chol(ΣRt)
(
Im 0m×2
02×m QRt,j
)′
,
where QRt,j is a two-dimensional Given's rotation matrix for which holds Q
′
Rt,j
QRt,j =
Q−1Rt,jQRt,j = I2. To nd the rotations QRt,j of each scheme, I initially compute the
Cholesky decomposition of the residual covariance matrix ΣRt . Then I rotate the lower-
right 2 × 2 submatrix of the Cholesky factor such that QRt,j satises the identifying as-
sumption of scheme j. As a result, I obtain the impact matrix of the EBP-max scheme,
PRt,1, and the impact matrix of the UN-max scheme, PRt,2
3.
Apart from the large versions of both shocks the PFA implicitly also denes small
versions. They arise from the fact that after controlling for the factors in the FAVAR,
the uncertainty proxy and the EBP are still positively correlated. For that reason the
(large) nancial shock of the EBP-max scheme is associated with a rise in the uncertainty
proxy. The uncertainty shock, in turn, is the residual component of uncertainty that is not
explained by the EBP under this scheme. As a result, it turns out small in size relative
to the uncertainty shock of the UN-max scheme. The analogous denition applies to the
UN-max scheme: since the large uncertainty shock is inated with nancial components
(measured by the EBP), the nancial shock is the residual part of the EBP that is not
explained by the uncertainty proxy, and thus relatively small.
3.2.3 Identication bounds
A valuable property of the PFA is that it provides identication bounds on the impact of
uncertainty and nancial shocks. Since the large versions of both shocks induce a more
substantial decline in real activity and asset prices than the small versions, they will always
yield the lower of both IRFs. The small shocks accordingly generate the upper IRF. As a
result, the PFA restricts a corridor for the possible eects on macroeconomic variables.
This corridor is useful from an agnostic point of view since it reects dierent perspec-
tives in the literature. On the one hand, theories and ndings emphasizing uncertainty
shocks as driving forces of the business cycle and nancial conditions (Alessandri and
Mumtaz, 2018; Bloom, 2009; Christiano et al., 2014) are mirrored by the UN-max scheme,
hence the lower bound of uncertainty shocks and the upper bound of nancial shocks. On
the other hand, views emphasizing the endogeneity of uncertainty to other shocks rather
than its exogeneity (Ludvigson et al., 2015; Popescu and Smets, 2010; Carriero et al., 2018)
are echoed by the EBP-max scheme, hence the upper bound of uncertainty shocks and the
lower bound of nancial shocks.
Moreover, the bounds refer to dierent implicit transmission channels. Uncertainty
shocks, for instance, act through at least two mechanisms. First, partial irreversibility
3This design of the PFA is a generalization of the Cholesky identication since it collapses to Cholesky
if the IRF horizon h is zero. Moreover, the PFA implies that depending on the chosen IRF horizon,
contractionary nancial and uncertainty shocks induce a prolonged period of elevated nancial stress and
uncertainty, respectively. I follow Caldara et al. (2016) in choosing h = 6 months. However, the robustness
checks in section 3.5.5 show that other horizons yield similar results.
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of investment decisions creates a real option eect, as described by Bloom (2009) and
Bachmann and Bayer (2013). Specically, more uncertain business conditions make en-
trepreneurs defer real capital expenditures or recruiting and wait until prospects become
clearer. This narrative applies to both versions of the uncertainty shock since each of them
induces an increase in uncertainty. An uncertainty shock arising from the UN-max scheme,
however, also works through a nancial transmission channel. Since it produces a rise in
the EBP it increases the price of external nance, resulting in further macroeconomic con-
traction. This mechanism underlies the nancial view on uncertainty shocks discussed by
Alessandri and Mumtaz (2018) and Christiano et al. (2014).
Financial shocks can be considered analogously. In general, they increase the EBP and
thus the cost of external nancing, leading to a decline in real activity and asset prices. In
the EBP-max scheme, however, they also induce a rise in uncertainty that intensies the
overall eects. Firms might be uncertain about how severely business conditions worsen in
response to the nancial shock and to which degree monetary and scal authorities coun-
teract, and accordingly keep a low prole. Baker et al. (2016), for example, document that
economic policy uncertainty increases during times of nancial turmoil and that economic
policy uncertainty, in turn, has notable real eects4.
3.3 Estimation
The estimation of the reduced-form FAVAR (equations (3.1) and (3.2)) is Bayesian, and
I implement it using a Gibbs sampling routine5. Since I measure uncertainty by three
dierent proxies, I also estimate the FAVAR three times. Each time the FAVAR incorpo-
rates the EBP and one of the three uncertainty proxies forming the nance-uncertainty
bloc. The estimation settings are otherwise identical. I describe the uncertainty proxies in
section 3.4.
Before I start the estimation, I split the observations into a recession and a boom
subsample according to the chronology of the NBER. The sequence of regimes is presented
in Figure C.2. Since I carry out the Gibbs sampling steps for each regime separately using
only its specic observations, I omit the regime subindex Rt in the following.
The sampling of the observation equation coecients Λi and ω2i is conducted for each
Xi,t separately, i.e., equation-wise. The priors are (independent) Normal and inverse-
Gamma, respectively. The prior of the VAR parametersB and Σ is normal inverse-Wishart.
Further details on the priors and hyperparameters can be found in section C.2.
4 However, the existing evidence on the propagation of nancial shocks through uncertainty does not
account for regime-specic dynamics. Caldara et al. (2016) and Baker et al. (2016) base their conclusions
on constant-parameter VARs.
5In the baseline estimation setup, the number of lags in the VAR part and the number of latent factors
are set to p = 6 months and m = 4, respectively. However, the robustness checks in section 3.5.5 show
that other choices of p and m do not aect my conclusions.
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Given the two subsamples and the priors, the Gibbs sampling steps are the following:
1. I sample from the conditional posterior distributions of the coecients Λi and ω2i of
the observation equation (3.1), which are given by
Λi|Xi, ω2i ∼ N(Λi,ΣΛi), ω2i |Xi,Λi ∼ IG(φ, θi)
2. I sample from the conditional posterior distributions of the coecients B and Σ of
the transition equation (3.2), i.e., the VAR part. They are given by
vec(B)|Y,Σ ∼ N
(
vec(B),ΣB
)
, Σ|Y ∼ IW
(
S, α
)
3. I run the Kalman lter and then the Carter-Kohn algorithm to nd the factors Ft.
The ltering is conditional on the regime-specic estimates of Λ, Ω, B, and Σ. Hence,
it switches between the recession regime and the boom regime.
To ensure convergence, I repeat these steps 10,000 times from which I discard the rst
5,000 repetitions. Details on the conditional posteriors of the observation equation and the
transition equation can be found in section C.2.
3.4 Data
The time series I use in the analysis are at monthly frequency and span the period 1975:m1-
2016:m8. This time window contains T = 500 observations of which 61 are NBER reces-
sions. The series contained in Xt and the nance-uncertainty bloc are described in more
detail in the following.
I take the excess bond premium (EBP) introduced by Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012)
as a proxy for nancial stress. The EBP is based on a credit spread index comprising a
large number of prices of corporate bonds trading in the secondary market. It forms the
component of the index that is not explained by the available rm-specic information
on expected defaults, hence it approximates the pricing of default risk in the corporate
bond market. The authors show that an increase in the EBP reects a lower capacity
or willingness of taking risk in the nancial sector and, consequently, a reduction in the
supply of credit.
Since uncertainty is a wide concept and hard to measure, I use three dierent indicators
as proxies. To measure macroeconomic uncertainty, I rely on the uncertainty measure pro-
posed by Jurado et al. (2015). It is based on the conditional volatility of the unpredictable
component of real economic activity derived from a factor model that comprises a large
number of macroeconomic series6. I call it the JLN measure in the following.
To highlight the role of nancial uncertainty, I use the VXO volatility index published
by the Chicago Board Options Exchange. For the period from January 1986 onward,
6Jurado et al. (2015) use dierent forecast horizons to construct the series. I choose one month as
horizon in my analysis, but choosing three or twelve months does not alter the results.
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this index corresponds to the implied volatility of S&P100 options 30 days to expiration.
For the Pre-1986 period I follow Bloom (2009) in using realized stock return volatility7,
measured by monthly standard deviations of the S&P500. I call the compound series the
Bloom measure hereafter.
As a proxy for economic policy uncertainty I use the newspaper-based index by Baker
et al. (2016), which I call the BBD measure in the following. This index rests upon the
frequency of newspaper references to policy-related economic uncertainty. Details can be
found in the paper.
The vector Xt contains 101 key macroeconomic and nancial variables for the United
States. The selection of series is orientated at the data set by Forni and Gambetti (2010)
and a list of them is presented in Table C.2. Since I extract factors, I standardize every
series in Xt to obtain a zero mean and a variance of one. Series which exhibit a seasonal
pattern are seasonally adjusted. To prevent my results from being driven by outliers, I
follow Carstensen and Salzmann (2017) and Stock and Watson (2005) in trimming any
observation that is further than ve times the interquartile range away from its median to
the respective threshold. The data is taken from the webpage of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis.
3.5 Results
I base my conclusions on state-dependent impulse responses of real economic indicators and
asset prices to uncertainty and nancial shocks and forecast error variance decompositions.
In addition, I present cross-eects between the EBP and uncertainty, that is to say, the
reaction of uncertainty proxies to a nancial shock and that of the EBP to an uncertainty
shock. I rely on three estimated versions of the FAVAR, each of which includes the EBP
and one of the three uncertainty proxies. I present the results from the EBP-max and
the UN-max identication jointly in one gure or table to depict them as identication
bounds.
3.5.1 Cross-eects of uncertainty and nancial shocks
Figure 3.1 shows state-dependent IRFs of the EBP and the uncertainty proxies to exogenous
innovations in nancial conditions and uncertainty. The labels JLN, Bloom, and BBD
above the panels stand for the uncertainty measure used in the FAVAR. In each panel, the
solid graphs result from the EBP-max scheme and thus depict the eects of the large
nancial shock and the small uncertainty shock. The dashed graphs result from the UN-
max scheme and accordingly represent the eects of the large uncertainty shock and the
small nancial shock8.
7For the pre-1986 period the VXO index is unavailable, so Bloom (2009) takes the monthly standard
deviation of the daily S&P500 index normalized to the same mean and variance as the VXO index when
the series overlap from 1986 onward.
8I adjust the shock magnitudes to obtain a predetermined response of the uncertainty proxies and the
EBP. In particular, I scale the large uncertainty shock such that the corresponding uncertainty proxy
jumps on impact by one regime-specic standard deviation. I adjust the size of the small uncertainty
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As the panels A) and C) show, nancial and uncertainty shocks induce a persistent rise
in their respective indicators. Moreover, except for the hump-shaped reaction of the JLN
measure all eects peak on impact. The dierences between the small and large shock
versions are generally signicant but slightly larger in terms of uncertainty shocks.
The panels B) and D) show the cross-eects of both shocks. We see that in general,
they are larger in recessions and have wider identication bounds than in boom periods.
Moreover, they are considerably smaller if the shocks arise from the residual components of
the indicators derived from the PFA. In the UN-max scheme, the EBP jumps on impact by
up to 2.5 standard deviations in response to an uncertainty shock, a result which conrms
the transmitting role of credit conditions (e.g., Christiano et al., 2014 and Alessandri and
Mumtaz, 2018). In the EBP-max scheme, however, only shocks to the JLN measure have
a positive and signicant impact on the EBP. The cross-eects of nancial shocks dier
from those of uncertainty shocks since the eect magnitudes tend to be smaller and the
identication bounds tighter.
These ndings imply three conclusions: rst, the optimization setup in the PFA and
thus identifying assumptions play a pivotal role for uncertainty shocks. By comparison,
nancial shocks exhibit a slightly better identiability since the bandwidth of possible
eects is tighter. Second, large uncertainty shocks are associated with a considerable
tightening in credit conditions, while large nancial shocks only induce a moderate increase
in uncertainty. The small versions of both shocks generally have limited cross-eects.
Third, cross-eects between the EBP and uncertainty and the identication scheme play
a greater role in the recession regime.
3.5.2 Macroeconomic impact of uncertainty shocks
Figure 3.2 shows the IRFs of the percentage 3-month growth rates of industrial production,
employment, stock prices, and house prices to adverse uncertainty shocks.
The IRFs conrm the contractionary character of uncertainty that has been found by
other contributions (e.g., Caldara et al., 2016). The impacts of the shocks are larger
in recessions than in boom periods and hence state-dependent, albeit to a dierent extent
depending on the chosen uncertainty measure. Shocks to the JLN measure reduce industrial
production growth by up to 1.5 percentage points in recessions but have insignicant eects
in boom periods9. In contrast, innovations in the BBD measure exhibit a considerably
milder state-dependence. Interestingly, house prices fall during recessions but tend to
increase in booms, a result that might arise from a ight-to-safety mechanism (Brogaard
and Detzel, 2015).
The IRFs exhibit wide identication bounds in recessions. Whereas a shock to the
Bloom measure reduces stock returns by up to 15 percentage points in the UN-max scheme,
shock proportionally. I repeat this procedure for the nancial shock: its large version raises the EBP by
one regime-specic standard deviation and the size of the small version adapts accordingly.
9This nding draws a picture of the role of uncertainty which is more dierentiated than what other
empirical works have found so far. Jurado et al. (2015), for example, show in a constant-parameter VAR
that uncertainty has an adverse and considerable impact on real activity. My ndings, however, indicate
that the observations in the recession regime are primarily relevant in this proposition.
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Figure 3.1: Cross-eects of uncertainty and nancial shocks
(a) Response of uncertainty to an uncertainty shock
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(b) Response of the EBP to an uncertainty shock
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(c) Response of the EBP to a nancial shock
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(d) Response of uncertainty to a nancial shock
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Notes: The panels show regime-specic impulse response functions (IRFs) of uncertainty and the EBP to a contrac-
tionary uncertainty shock and a nancial shock. The headings JLN, Bloom, and BBD stand for the uncertainty
measure used in the FAVAR. The units on the y-axis are standard deviations of the responding variables. The red
graphs depict the IRFs in the recession regime and the blue graphs those in the boom regime. The solid and dashed
graphs are median IRFs resulting from the EBP-max and the UN-max identication, respectively. The shaded areas
are 68 percent condence intervals on the IRFs of the EBP-max identication. The uncertainty shocks are scaled
such that the large shock induces a rise in the corresponding uncertainty proxy by one regime-specic standard
deviation. The analogous scaling is applied to the nancial shocks.
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it has insignicant eects in the EBP-max scheme. Hence, the identication entirely ac-
counts for the state-dependence in this case. The eects on the real indicators tend to
be more robust. The IRFs of the EBP-max scheme amount to about 50 percent of those
implied by the UN-max scheme, which implies that small uncertainty shocks are likewise
contractionary. Taking this result together with the limited impact of small uncertainty
shocks on credit conditions (section 3.5.1), I conclude that nancial conditions play an
essential role in transmitting uncertainty shocks but real option eects are also at work.
To account for the relative importance of uncertainty shocks for the considered indica-
tors, I compute variance decompositions after 24 months10, displayed in Table 3.1. I follow
Bernanke et al. (2005) in assessing the importance of the shocks relative only to the portion
of the indicators explained by the common factors, hence I focus on cyclical uctuations11.
The decompositions conrm the ndings from the impulse response analysis. In general,
uncertainty shocks are of limited importance in boom periods but contribute signicantly
to macroeconomic uctuations in recessions. Moreover, the higher relevance of uncertainty
shocks in recessions comes along with broader identication bounds. These often include
variance shares close to zero, only the JLN measure exhibits signicant fractions in the
EBP-max specication.
Both the IRFs and the variance decompositions show that among the considered uncer-
tainty measures, the Bloom index exhibits the widest identication bounds. For example,
its relative contribution to cyclical uctuations of stock returns ranges between zero and 46
percent (!). On the one hand, this could indicate that a (large) nancial uncertainty shock
leads to a tightening in credit conditions, which in turn aects real indicators and asset
prices. On the other hand, it may also reect the diculty of distinguishing between rst
and second-moment nancial disturbances. Accordingly, Stock and Watson (2012) nd in
their analysis of the channels of the Great Recession that credit spreads and proxies for
nancial uncertainty do not identify distinct shocks.
Another striking result is that shocks to the BBD measure are of limited relevance since
they only pertain to stock returns. This contrasts Baker et al. (2016), who nd in a classical
VAR that an adverse economic policy uncertainty shock reduces industrial production and
employment to a moderate but signicant degree. There are multiple reasons for this
discrepancy, but one is presumably due to the conditioning on the EBP in the empirical
setup12.
As a result, I rely on the JLN measure of macroeconomic uncertainty for the remainder
of this paper. I base this choice not only on the identication issues of the Bloom index
10I omitted variance decompositions at other horizons since they do not aect my conclusions.
11As a result, I ignore the idiosyncratic component here. Bernanke et al. (2005) justify this approach by
the assumption that the idiosyncratic component reects in part measurement error and thus should not
react to business cycle determinants.
12Baker et al. (2016) nd that a shock of two standard deviations in the BBD index lowers industrial
production by 1.1 percent and employment by 0.35 percent nine months after the shock. Under the
UN-max setup, I nd slightly smaller corresponding eects, namely between 0.27 percent (recessions)
and 0.31 percent (boom periods) on industrial production and between 0.1 percent (recessions) and 0.12
percent (boom periods) on employment. Apart from the conditioning on nancial stress, the Bayesian
estimation setup might also play a role for the dierent results since the mean parameters are shrunk
towards zero. Moreover, Baker et al. (2016) order uncertainty rst in a Cholesky identication with real
economic indicators, implying that uncertainty shocks potentially contain business cycle components.
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Figure 3.2: Macroeconomic eects of an uncertainty shock
(a) Industrial production growth
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(b) Employment growth
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(c) Stock returns
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(d) House price ination
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Notes: The panels show regime-specic impulse response functions (IRFs) of the percentage 3-month growth rates
of industrial production, employment, stock prices, and house prices to a contractionary uncertainty shock. The
headings JLN, Bloom, and BBD stand for the uncertainty measure used in the FAVAR. The red graphs depict
the IRFs in the recession regime and the blue graphs those in the boom regime. The solid and dashed graphs
are median IRFs resulting from the EBP-max and the UN-max identication, respectively. The shaded areas are
68 percent condence intervals on the IRFs of the EBP-max identication. The shock magnitudes are adjusted
such that the large uncertainty shock induces a rise in the corresponding uncertainty proxy by one regime-specic
standard deviation.
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Table 3.1: Forecast error variance decomposition - Uncertainty shock
Recessions Booms
XXXXXXXXXXXXVariable
Identication
+Regime EBP-max UN-max EBP-max UN-max
Uncertainty measure: JLN
Industrial production growth 8.0 17.1 0.6 2.0
Employment growth 10.1 18.2 1.6 3.4
Stock returns 4.6 30.3 2.4 11.5
House price ination 14.1 22.3 7.2 6.3
Uncertainty measure: Bloom
Industrial production growth 2.8 12.9 0.7 7.4
Employment growth 1.7 11.8 0.4 4.8
Stock returns 0.4 45.5 1.9 18.5
House price ination 1.4 23.6 2.6 5.5
Uncertainty measure: BBD
Industrial production growth 0.2 1.5 0.5 3.8
Employment growth 0.2 1.9 0.4 2.4
Stock returns 7.2 27.8 35.0 61.6
House price ination 0.3 4.8 16.4 11.1
Notes: The table shows the percentage shares of the forecast error variance of the common component
of key macroeconomic variables accounted for by an uncertainty shock. The forecast horizon is set to 24
months.
and the limited relevance of the BBD measure but also on the result by Caldara et al.
(2016) that the JLN measure gives economic uncertainty the maximum role in explaining
business cycle uctuations out of a set of uncertainty measures, including those I use. I
conrm this nding for the state-specic case since only the JLN measure signicantly
contributes to the cyclical components in both identication schemes13.
3.5.3 Macroeconomic impact of nancial shocks
Figure 3.3 displays the IRFs of the real economic indicators and asset prices to an adverse
nancial shock using the JLN measure of uncertainty in the FAVAR. As in the case of un-
certainty shocks, nancial shocks are contractionary and state-dependent. The eects are
more pronounced in recessions than in boom periods, especially if we consider asset returns.
Stock returns, for example, fall by up to nine percentage points in recessions but only by
two percentage points in boom periods. The real indicators moreover exhibit state-specic
dynamic patterns. Whereas industrial production growth falls by 0.2 percentage points
after six months and remains negative in boom periods, it falls by up to 0.4 percentage
points in recessions, recovers within ten months and overshoots. The overshoot, however,
is not statistically signicant.
13For the sake of completeness and to review the robustness of the baseline results, I show the IRFs and
variance shares of the nancial shock using the other two uncertainty measures in Figure C.1 and Table
C.1.
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Figure 3.3: Macroeconomic eects of a nancial shock
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Notes: The panels show regime-specic impulse response functions (IRFs) of the percentage 3-month growth rates
of industrial production, employment, stock prices, and house prices to a contractionary nancial shock using the
JLN measure of uncertainty. The red graphs depict the IRFs in the recession regime and the blue graphs those in
the boom regime. The solid and dashed graphs are median IRFs resulting from the EBP-max and the UN-max
identication, respectively. The shaded areas are 68 percent condence intervals on the IRFs of the EBP-max
identication. The shock magnitudes are adjusted such that the large nancial shock induces a rise in the EBP by
one regime-specic standard deviation.
The IRFs are more robust to identifying assumptions than those of uncertainty shocks.
The dashed and solid graphs signicantly dier only in the state of recession and in terms
of the real indicators. In this case, however, the dierence is sizeable since the real eect
in the EBP-max scheme is twice as large as the eect in the UN-max scheme14.
The forecast error variance shares of the nancial shock are reported in Table 3.2.
We see that they are signicant in both states of the economy, a nding which contrasts
Table 3.1 on uncertainty shocks. The identication bounds are again of considerable width
in recessions. For instance, the shares of cyclical uctuations of industrial production
growth accounted for by nancial shocks range between 6 and 16 percent. In booms,
however, the limits are barely distinguishable, a result that reects the limited impact of
nancial shocks on macroeconomic uncertainty discussed in section 3.5.1. Hence, whereas
nancial disturbances act through a purely nancial transmission channel in boom periods,
uncertainty noticeably transmits them in recessions. Interestingly, if we consider the UN-
max scheme and the real indicators, the fractions of the nancial shock are slightly smaller
in recessions than in boom periods. At the same time, the shares in the EBP-max scheme
are almost identical in both regimes. I conclude from this nding that compared to the
boom regime, the nancial channel shrinks in favor of the uncertainty channel in recessions.
This result highlights a property of nancial shocks that is underrepresented in the
related literature. Many contributions in this eld still rely on constant-parameter models
and consequently do not allow for dierent regimes of economic stress, for example Caldara
et al. (2013) or Popescu and Smets (2010). Since the number of stressful periods is usually
small relative to the total number of observations (61 recession periods vs. 439 boom
periods in this paper), their conclusions are congruent with mine during boom periods,
which is that uncertainty plays a negligible role in transmitting nancial shocks.
14This nding hinges on the chosen uncertainty measure. As Figure C.1 and Table C.1 show, if I choose
the BBD measure the identication bounds are barely distinguishable even in recessions. Hence, the
transmission of nancial shocks by economic policy uncertainty is negligible.
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Table 3.2: Forecast error variance decomposition - Financial shock
Recessions Booms
XXXXXXXXXXXXVariable
Identication
+Regime EBP-max UN-max EBP-max UN-max
Industrial production growth 15.6 6.2 14.8 13.4
Employment growth 16.2 7.8 13.4 11.5
Stock returns 63.2 36.9 77.7 68.5
House price ination 40.5 31.7 6.6 7.5
Notes: The table shows the percentage shares of the forecast error variance of the common component of
key macroeconomic variables accounted for by a nancial shock. The JLN proxy is used as measure for
uncertainty in the FAVAR. The forecast horizon is set to 24 months.
3.5.4 Impacts on sectoral employment
To further exploit the cross-sectional dimension of the FAVAR framework, I analyze the
relevance of uncertainty and nancial shocks for important macroeconomic disaggregates.
Table 3.3 shows the relative contributions of both shocks to the cyclical uctuations of
sectoral employment growth. In general, the considered employment indicators conrm the
conclusions of sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. Whereas uncertainty shocks account for signicant
variance shares only in recessions, nancial shocks are relevant in both regimes. Moreover,
nancial shocks identied by the UN-max scheme are slightly more important in booms
than in recessions.
However, the relevance of both shocks diers across sectors. Uncertainty shocks are
generally important for employment uctuations in the private sector and especially pertain
to nancial activities, trade, manufacturing, the goods producing sector, and the service
sector. The shares in the EBP-max scheme are around half as large as those in the UN-
max in most sectors, which again reects a lack of identication robustness of uncertainty
shocks. Interestingly, the bounds are very tight in terms of employment in the nancial
industries.
The ranking between the sectors is similar if we look at nancial shocks. Again, the pri-
vate sector is generally aected, but especially trade, manufacturing, the goods producing
sector, and the service sector. Not unexpectedly, the government sector is little eected
by both shocks.
Compared to uncertainty shocks, nancial shocks exhibit a relatively low weight in the
nancial sector. This nding is puzzling at rst sight but results from the fact that the
EBP only contains bond prices of non-nancial rms. Moreover, Prassas (2011) shows
that historically, employment in nancial activities has been little aected by economic
downturns, thus times in which the EBP is typically high. The only exception was the
period around the Great Recession of 2008/09 when housing-related nancial industries
lost 348,000 jobs.
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Table 3.3: Forecast error variance decomposition - Sectoral employment
growth
Recessions Booms
XXXXXXXXXXXXSector
Identication
+Regime EBP-max UN-max EBP-max UN-max
Uncertainty shocks
Total 10.1 18.2 1.6 3.4
Manufacturing 7.9 17.8 0.6 2.0
Construction 12.6 12.0 3.3 5.3
Total private industries 9.8 18.0 1.4 3.2
Government 2.4 3.1 4.2 4.4
Retail trade 10.9 17.7 1.0 2.4
Wholesale trade 11.5 20.0 1.0 2.7
Financial activities 22.2 20.3 1.7 2.8
Mining and logging 12.2 19.5 0.2 0.7
Durable goods 8.2 17.5 0.8 2.4
Nondurable goods 7.4 18.6 0.2 0.8
Goods-producing industries 10.3 17.4 1.3 3.1
Service-providing industries 12.0 20.0 1.8 3.5
Trade, transportation and utilities 10.2 18.6 1.2 2.9
Financial shocks
Total 16.2 7.8 13.4 11.5
Manufacturing 16.8 6.6 14.9 13.4
Construction 7.5 7.9 10.9 8.8
Total private industries 15.9 7.4 13.9 12.1
Government 4.0 3.2 0.7 0.5
Retail trade 14.2 7.1 13.0 11.6
Wholesale trade 17.1 8.3 14.3 12.4
Financial activities 10.9 12.4 7.8 6.7
Mining and logging 17.1 9.5 8.0 7.4
Durable goods 16.3 6.7 15.0 13.3
Nondurable goods 18.0 6.5 13.7 13.0
Goods-producing industries 15.0 7.5 14.5 12.6
Service-providing industries 17.3 8.9 12.0 10.2
Trade, transportation and utilities 16.0 7.3 13.9 12.1
Notes: The table shows the percentage shares of the forecast error variance of the common component of
sectoral employment growth accounted for by an uncertainty shock and a nancial shock. The JLN proxy
is used as measure for uncertainty in the FAVAR. The forecast horizon is set to 24 months.
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3.5.5 Robustness checks
As customary in empirical papers, I perform several sensitivity checks to strengthen the
credibility of my results. I re-estimate the FAVAR using a range of alternative settings
in which I depart from a single property of the baseline setup while leaving all others
unchanged. Figure 3.4 and Table 3.4 show the resulting IRFs and variance decompositions
of employment growth after a shock to the JLN measure and a nancial shock alongside
the baseline results.
First, I check the robustness of the ndings to changes in the VAR lag order. In the
baseline setup, I allow for p = 6 months which has been considered sucient in various
business cycle VARs, e.g., Eickmeier (2010). However, to account for potential serial
correlation in the disturbance term ut and since other applications such as Bachmann et
al. (2013) use a lag order of 12 months, I re-estimate the FAVAR with p = 12. As Table 3.4
shows, this alternative specication yields slightly larger variance shares of the nancial
shock during boom periods. The remaining results and especially the IRFs are nevertheless
very similar to those of the baseline setup, from which I conclude that the lag order does
not play a signicant role.
I also test if the number of latent factors in the FAVAR drives my results. I initially
set it to m = 4 to already capture 78 percent of the variance of Xt. Since a fth factor
accounts for another six percent, I check its relevance in a further estimation with m = 5.
This alternative setting yields slightly smaller variance shares accounted for by nancial
shocks in boom periods. However, the overall picture of the results conrms the conclusions
obtained from the baseline setup.
Table 3.4: Robustness checks
Recessions Booms
``````````````̀Modication
Identication
+Regime EBP-max UN-max EBP-max UN-max
Uncertainty shocks
Baseline 10.1 18.2 1.6 3.4
12 lags 9.0 18.7 1.2 3.8
Number of factors 5.5 15.2 0.4 0.2
Rotation horizon 9.1 14.7 0.9 1.8
Control for monetary policy 6.6 9.5 0.2 0.4
Financial shocks
Baseline 16.2 7.8 13.4 11.5
12 lags 16.8 6.7 19.9 17.4
Number of factors 16.4 6.5 8.2 8.3
Rotation horizon 18.3 11.4 13.7 12.7
Control for monetary policy 12.5 9.3 12.6 12.4
Notes: The table shows the percentage shares of the forecast error variance of the common component of
employment growth accounted for by an uncertainty shock and a nancial shock. The JLN proxy is used
as measure for uncertainty in the FAVAR. The forecast horizon is set to 24 months.
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Figure 3.4: Robustness checks
(a) Uncertainty shock
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(b) Financial shock
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Notes: The panels show regime-specic impulse response functions (IRFs) of the percentage 3-month growth rates
of employment to a contractionary uncertainty shock and a nancial shock. The JLN proxy is used as measure for
uncertainty in the FAVAR. The red graphs depict the IRFs in the recession regime and the blue graphs those in
the boom regime. The solid and dashed graphs are median IRFs resulting from the EBP-max and the UN-max
identication, respectively. The shaded areas are 68 percent condence intervals on the IRFs of the EBP-max
identication. The uncertainty shocks are scaled such that the large shock induces a rise in the corresponding
uncertainty proxy by one regime-specic standard deviation. The analogous scaling is applied to the nancial
shocks.
3.6. Conclusion 93
The IRF horizon h in the PFA is an ingredient of my shock identication and thus
another potential determinant of the results. I follow Caldara et al. (2016) in choosing
six months since they nd this horizon optimal for identifying uncertainty and nancial
shocks in a constant-parameter VAR. To check if this choice is relevant, I apply the PFA
using h = 12 months and the baseline estimates. Since the resulting IRFs and variance
decompositions do not noticeably deviate from those of the baseline setup, I conclude that
the identication horizon does not play a signicant role either.
Finally, I include the federal funds rate (FFR) as observable variable into the FAVAR
to control for the stance of monetary policy15. I place it at the bottom of the nance-
uncertainty bloc and re-estimate the FAVAR, hence I treat the FFR as the most fast-
moving variable (see, e.g., Prieto et al., 2016). This modication leads to slightly smaller
variance shares accounted for by uncertainty shocks, but it again does not aect the overall
picture of the results.
3.6 Conclusion
I analyze the eects of uncertainty and nancial shocks based on a state-dependent FAVAR
and U.S. data from 1975 to 2016. The FAVAR allows for a recession and a boom regime and
includes a comprehensive set of macroeconomic and nancial variables, dierent proxies
for uncertainty, and a nancial stress indicator. To identify exogenous innovations in
nancial conditions and uncertainty, I employ the penalty function approach proposed by
Uhlig (2005). This approach enables constructing identication bounds that consider both
shocks jointly and provide a corridor for their eects on macroeconomic indicators. The
bounds are moreover agnostic since they unite various perspectives on the shocks in one
framework and refer to dierent implicit transmission mechanisms.
I document that uncertainty shocks have highly state-dependent eects on real activity
and asset prices. They are of limited relevance in boom periods but have a contractionary
impact in recessions. By contrast, nancial shocks result in signicant macroeconomic
eects in both regimes.
However, identifying assumptions play a non-negligible role in recessions. They tend to
be more relevant for uncertainty shocks than for nancial shocks, especially if we consider
the impact on asset prices. In this case, the identication bounds of nancial shocks are
relatively tight. Those of uncertainty shocks, however, are broad and allow for large as
well as negligible eects. As a result, uncertainty shocks are potentially of minor relevance
for asset price uctuations if they are modeled jointly with nancial shocks. If we look
at real activity, the bandwidth of possible eects is sizeable for both shocks. This implies
that uncertainty shocks have real economic implications by worsening credit conditions
and, conversely, nancial shocks are transmitted by higher uncertainty.
15Since the FFR fell to its zero lower bound during and after the Great Recession, namely from December
2008 until November 2015, I replace the observations in this period by the shadow short rates proposed
by Krippner (2015).
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Appendix A
Additional Material, Chapter 1
A.1 Rotation of factors
We rotate the three factors of the full country sample as follows. We dene the three-
dimensional rotation matrix R with R′R = RR′ = I such that the rotated factor decom-
position remains observationally equivalent to the non-rotated model:
vt = Γf
G14
t + ξt = ΓR
′RfG14t + ξt = Γ̃f̃t
G14
+ ξt (A.1)
E
[
f̃t
G14
(f̃t
G14
)′
]
= RE
[
fG14t (f
G14
t )
′]R′ = RR′ = Ik (A.2)
where fG14t denotes the unrotated and f̃t
G14
= RfG14t the rotated factors. Dening ri as
the ith row of R, the ith rotated factor is f̃G14it = rif
G14
t .
We choose R to maximize the correlation between the rst two factors from the second
stage (based on the G14 sample) with those from the rst stage, fG7t (based on the G7
sample). To this end, we dene the objective functions h1 and h2 which represent the
correlation between the respective factors:
h1 = corr(f̃
G14
1t , f
G7
1t ) =
∑
f̃G141t f
G7
1t
T − 1
= r1
∑
fG14t f
G7
1t
T − 1
= r1
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G14
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where cij denotes as the correlation between the ith unrotated second-stage factor and the
jth rst-stage factor.
Constructing R as
R =
1 0 00 cos(α) − sin(α)
0 sin(α) cos(α)

 cos(β) 0 sin(β)0 1 0
− sin(β) 0 cos(β)

cos(γ) − sin(γ) 0sin(γ) cos(γ) 0
0 0 1

we choose α, β and γ such that these correlations are maximized. A closed-form solution
is available upon request.
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A.2 Bayesian VAR Estimation
We estimate the VAR (1.4) with p = 4 lags applying Bayesian methods following standard
practice along the lines of Ba«bura et al. (2010), Sims and Zha (1998), and Kadiyala and
Karlsson (1997). The coecients A1, . . . , Ap are assumed to be a priorily independent and
normally distributed with moments
E[(Al)ij ] =
δi, j = i, l = 10, otherwise , Var[(Al)ij ] =

λ2
l2
, j = i
λ2σ2i
l2σ2j
, otherwise
(A.5)
where the hyperparameter λ governs the degree of shrinkage. Following Ba«bura et al.
(2010) we set δi to the estimate of a univariate autoregression of yit with lag length 1,
and choose σ2i as the residual variance of a univariate autoregression of yit with lag length
p = 4. In order to implement the priors we write (1.4) in matrix form as
Y = XB + U (A.6)
where Y = (Y1, . . . , YT )′,X = (X1, . . . , XT )′ withXt = (Y ′t−1, . . . , Y
′
t−p)
′, U = (u1, . . . , uT )′,
and B = (A1, . . . , Ap)′. We follow Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) and impose a Normal
inverse-Wishart prior
vec(B)|Σ ∼ N(vec(B0),Σ⊗ Ω0) and Σ ∼ iW (S0, α0)
where the prior parameters B0,Ω0, S0 and α0 are set so that prior expectations and vari-
ances of B are consistent with (A.5) and the expectation of Σ is equal to a diagonal matrix
with diagonal elements σ2i .
We compute the posterior means B̃ = (Ã1, . . . , Ãp)′ using dummy observations as
proposed by Ba«bura et al. (2010). Based on these means, we identify and estimate
the factor model in exactly the same (frequentist) way as the FSVAR model (1.4) and
(1.5). Hence, we use the Bayesian approach simply as a cheap shrinkage estimator of an
unrestricted VAR model with four lags which is infeasible applying OLS.
A.3 Time-varying variances of structural shocks
Suppose the variances of the factors, ft, and the idiosyncratic shocks, ξt, are time-varying.
Then their (diagonal) variance matrices Σf,t and Σξ,t give rise to a time-varying variance
structure of the factor model,
Σt = ΓΣf,tΓ
′ + Σξ,t. (A.7)
Based on a sequence of estimates Σ1, . . . ,ΣT , we can re-estimate the coecient matrices
A1 to A4 of the baseline G14-FSVAR by FGLS.
To this end, we have to estimate the diagonal elements of Σf,t and Σξ,t. Since the shocks
xt = (f
′
t , ξ
′
t)
′ are mutually independent, we apply the univariate stochastic volatility model
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proposed by Chan and Hsiao (2013) on which we impose a random walk structure:
xit = e
1
2
hitεit, εit ∼ N(0, 1), (A.8)
hit = hi,t−1 + ζit, ζit ∼ N(0, ω2i ), (A.9)
with eectively unrestricted initial observation hi1 ∼ N(µ, 50ω2i ). We assume independent
prior distributions for µ and σ2h:
µ ∼ N(µ0, V0), ω2i ∼ IG(ν0, S0). (A.10)
We set µ0 = 0, V0 = 100, ν0 = 2.1, and S0 = 0.062(ν0 − 1). The prior for ω2i may deserve
some comments. It gives rise to a prior mean of S0/(1−ν0) = 0.062 = 4 ·0.032. Justiniano
and Primiceri (2008) use an inverse Gamma prior with mean 0.012 for the log standard
deviation 12ht which implies a mean of 4·0.01
2 for the log variance ht as in our specication.
Hence, in terms of the standard deviation ωi our prior assumes a volatility that is three
times larger than in Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). Since they analyze the U.S. while
we include more volatile countries, we believe our prior is an appropriate prior guess.1
Bayesian estimation is then performed by sampling from the joint posterior distribution
via the Gibbs sampler. We take 20,000 draws and allow for a burn-in period of 1,000 draws
to compute the posterior means of the standard deviations exp(ht/2). The details of the
estimation approach are described in Chan and Hsiao (2013).
A.4 Data sources
We use quarterly GDP per capita series at constant prices which we download from Datas-
tream (DS). A description of the data sources and their Datastream codes is given in Table
A.1. Unfortunately, for Brazil and China there are no consistent GDP series available that
cover the entire time period 1991-2014. Therefore we construct the series for these coun-
tries manually. In case of Brazil, the active series start in 1996 (DS code broexo03d), so
we backdate it to 1991 using growth rates of a GDP volume index under constant prices
(DS code broexp03h). For China, we use real GDP growth rates (DS code chgdp..%c)
for the period 1991-2014 from which we constructed an index that equals nominal GDP
in 2005 (DS code chgdpcuma). Since the population data are at an annual frequency we
log-linearly interpolate it to a quarterly frequency. Then we express real GDP in per-capita
terms. The series are seasonally adjusted by the OECD. The only exception is Chinese
GDP which we seasonally adjust by means of X-12 ARIMA in EViews. The sources for the
global macro indicators are reported in Table A.2. World industrial production, CPB
world trade, CPB manufacturing prices, World fuel prices, and World commodity
prices are taken from the CPB World Trade Monitor November 2015, OECD GDP and
Brent oil price stem from the OECD. The stock market volatility is based on the MSCI
World stock price index which we source from the MSCI database. Both the exchange
1Our conclusions are robust to choosing a smaller or an even higher prior mean.
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rate volatility and ination volatility are based on weighted variances of national exchange
rates and ination rates. In most cases, they are downloaded from the FRED database.
Table A.1: Data sources for real GDP and population
Series Datastream code Source Period
A. Real GDP
Australia auoexo03d OECD 1991-2014
Brazil broexp03h OECD 1991-1995
broexo03d OECD 1996-2014
Canada cnoexo03d OECD 1991-2014
China chgdp..%c NBS China 1991-2014
chgdpcuma NBS China 1991-2014
France froexo03d OECD 1991-2014
Germany bdoexo03d OECD 1991-2014
Italy itoexo03d OECD 1991-2014
Japan jpoexo03d OECD 1991-2014
Mexico mxoexo03d OECD 1991-2014
South Korea kooexo03d OECD 1991-2014
UK ukoexo03d OECD 1991-2014
US usoexo03d OECD 1991-2014
B. Population
Australia auoapopnp OECD 1991-2014
Brazil brpoptot IGBE Brazil 1991-2014
Canada cnoapopnp OECD 1991-2014
China choapopnp OECD 1991-2014
France froapopnp OECD 1991-2014
Germany bdoapopnp OECD 1991-2014
Italy itoapopnp OECD 1991-2014
Japan jpoapopnp OECD 1991-2014
Mexico mxoapopnp OECD 1991-2014
South Africa kooapopnp OECD 1991-2014
South Korea kooapopnp OECD 1991-2014
Turkey kooapopnp OECD 1991-2014
UK ukoapopnp OECD 1991-2014
US usoapopnp OECD 1991-2014
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Table A.2: Data sources: National macro indicators
National indicator Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Investment OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Consumption OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Exports OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
US Bureau
of Economic
Analysis
Imports OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
US Bureau
of Economic
Analysis
Employment OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Unemployment rate OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Current account bal-
ance
OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Real eective exchange
rates
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Nominal eective ex-
change rates
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
Bank for inter-
national settle-
ments
CPI ination OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
US Bureau of
Labor Statis-
tics
10-year government
bond rate
OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD OECD
Stock market returns S&P/TSX MSCI Deutsche Börse MSCI Nikkei FTSE Dow Jones
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B.1 Data
Figure B.1: Factors
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Notes: The panels show the series used in the baseline FAVAR. The Chinese GDP growth and ination
rates are mean-adjusted and displayed jointly with their trends. The estimation of the trends is outlined
in section 2.5.4.
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C.1 Further results
Table C.1: Forecast error variance decomposition - Financial shock
Recessions Booms
XXXXXXXXXXXXVariable
Identication
+Regime EBP-max UN-max EBP-max UN-max
Uncertainty measure: JLN
Industrial production growth 15.6 6.2 14.8 13.4
Employment growth 16.2 7.8 13.4 11.5
Stock returns 63.2 36.9 77.7 68.5
House price ination 40.5 31.7 6.6 7.5
Uncertainty measure: Bloom
Industrial production growth 12.0 2.3 16.8 10.1
Employment growth 13.1 3.4 12.2 7.7
Stock returns 83.2 38.2 77.3 60.6
House price ination 39.1 17.1 5.2 2.3
Uncertainty measure: BBD
Industrial production growth 8.9 7.3 18.3 14.9
Employment growth 10.1 8.1 17.8 15.7
Stock returns 72.3 51.3 50.7 24.1
House price ination 39.9 34.4 6.9 8.4
Notes: The table shows the percentage shares of the forecast error variance of the common component of
key macroeconomic variables accounted for by a nancial shock. The forecast horizon is set to 24 months.
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Figure C.1: Macroeconomic eects of a nancial shock
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(b) Employment growth
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(c) Stock returns
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(d) House price ination
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Notes: The panels show regime-specic impulse response functions (IRFs) of the percentage 3-month growth rates of
industrial production, employment, stock prices, and house prices to a contractionary nancial shock. The headings
JLN, Bloom, and BBD stand for the uncertainty measure used in the FAVAR. The red graphs depict the IRFs
in the recession regime and the blue graphs those in the boom regime. The solid and dashed graphs are median
IRFs resulting from the EBP-max and the UN-max identication, respectively. The shaded areas are 68 percent
condence intervals on the IRFs of the EBP-max identication. The shock magnitudes are adjusted such that the
large nancial shock induces a rise in the EBP by one regime-specic standard deviation.
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C.2 Priors and posteriors
Transition equation
I impose normal inverse Wishart (natural conjugate) priors along the lines of Ba«bura
et al. (2010), Sims and Zha (1998), and Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) for each of both
regimes. For better readability, I omit the regime subindices in the matrices here.
The coecients B1, . . . , Bp are assumed to be a priorily independent and normally
distributed with moments
E[(Bl)ij ] =
δi, j = i, l = 10, otherwise , Var[(Bl)ij ] =

λ2
l2
, j = i
λ2σ2i
l2σ2j
, otherwise
(C.1)
where the hyperparameter λ governs the degree of shrinkage. I follow Ba«bura et al. (2010)
in choosing σ2i as the residual variance of a univariate autoregression of Yi,t with lag length
p = 6. The parameter δi is set to the estimate of a univariate autoregression of Yi,t with
lag length 1. By setting the overall tightness parameter λ to 0.1 I follow Chiu and Hacioglu
Hoke (2016), Carriero et al. (2015b), and Canova (2011).
To implement the priors, I write the VAR in matrix form as
Y = B′Z + U
where Y = (Y1, . . . , YT ), Z = (Z1, . . . , ZT ) with Zt = (Y ′t−1, . . . , Y
′
t−p)
′, U = (u1, . . . , uT ),
and B = (B1, . . . , Bp)′. I follow Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997) and impose a Normal
inverse-Wishart prior
vec(B)|Σ ∼ N(vec(B),Σ⊗Ψ) and Σ ∼ IW (S, α)
where the prior parameters B, S, Ψ, and α are set so that they are consistent with equations
(C.1). The expectation of Σ is equal to a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements σ2i . The
conditional posterior distribution of the VAR parameters is given by
vec(B)|Σ, Y ∼ N
(
vec(B),Σ⊗Ψ
)
and Σ|Y ∼ IW
(
S, α
)
I compute the posterior parameters B, S, Ψ and α using dummy observations as proposed
by Ba«bura et al. (2010).
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Measurement equation
For each measurement equation
Xi,t = Λ
′
iYt + ξi,t
I assume an (independent) normal-inverse Gamma prior for Λi and ω2i = Var(ξi,t):
Λi ∼ N(Λ,ΣΛ) ω2i ∼ IG(φ, θ)
where Λ and ΣΛ are the prior moments of Λi and φ and θ are the prior degrees of freedom
and scaling parameters of ω2i , respectively. I follow Bernanke et al. (2005) in setting the
priors Λ = 0, ΣΛ = Ik, φ = 0.001, and θ = 3.
The conditional posterior distributions are derived in Koop (2003), p. 61:
Λi|Xi, ω2i ∼ N(Λi,ΣΛi) ω2i |Xi,Λi ∼ IG(φ, θi)
with the posterior parameters
Λi =
(
Σ−1Λ +
1
ω2i
Y Y ′
)−1(
Σ−1Λ Λ +
1
ω2i
Y X ′i
)
, ΣΛi =
(
Σ−1Λ +
1
ω2i
Y Y ′
)−1
θi = (Xi − Λ′iY )(Xi − Λ′iY )′ + θ, φ = T + φ.
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C.3 Data
Table C.2: Series in Xt
Variable Transf.
Real Disposable Personal Income 1
Personal Income 1
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures 1
Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing (NAICS), Percent of Capacity 0
Real Manufacturing and Trade Inventories 1
Industrial Production Index 1
Industrial Production: Consumer Goods 1
Industrial Production: Durable Consumer Goods 1
Industrial Production: Nondurable Consumer Goods 1
Industrial Production: Business Equipment 1
Industrial Production: Final products 1
Industrial Production: Fuels 1
Industrial Production: Residential utilities 1
Industrial Production: Materials 1
Industrial Production: Durable goods materials 1
Industrial Production: Nondurable goods materials 1
Industrial Production: Manufacturing (SIC) 1
Number of Civilians Unemployed for 5 to 14 Weeks 0
Number of Civilians Unemployed for 15 Weeks and Over 0
Number of Civilians Unemployed for 15 to 26 Weeks 0
Number of Civilians Unemployed for 27 Weeks and Over 0
Number of Civilians Unemployed for Less Than 5 Weeks 0
Civilian Unemployment Rate 0
Civilian Employment Level 1
All Employees: Total Nonfarm Payrolls 1
All Employees: Manufacturing 1
All Employees: Construction 1
All Employees: Total Private Industries 1
All Employees: Retail Trade 1
All Employees: Government 1
All Employees: Wholesale Trade 1
All Employees: Financial Activities 1
All Employees: Mining and Logging 1
All Employees: Durable Goods 1
All Employees: Nondurable goods 1
All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries 1
All Employees: Service-Providing Industries 1
All Employees: Trade, Transportation and Utilities 1
Average Weekly Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Total private 0
Average Weekly Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Goods-Producing 0
Average Weekly Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Manufacturing 0
Average Weekly Overtime Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Manufacturing 0
New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits in the Midwest Census Region 2
New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits in the Northeast Census Region 2
New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits, Thousands of Units 2
New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits in the South Census Region 2
New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits in the West Census Region 2
Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started, Thousands of Units 2
Housing Starts in Midwest Census Region, Thousands of Units 2
Housing Starts in Northeast Census Region, Thousands of Units 2
Housing Starts in South Census Region, Thousands of Units 2
Housing Starts in West Census Region, Thousands of Units 2
M1 Money Stock 1
M2 Money Stock 1
Monetary Base 1
Notes: The table shows the series contained in the vector Xt of the FAVAR and their transformations. The codes
have the following meaning: 0 = no transformation; 1 = 3-month log dierences; 2 = logs. The transformations are
orientated at Forni and Gambetti (2010).
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Table C.2: Series in Xt ctd.
Variable Transf.
Reserves of Depository Institutions, Nonborrowed 1
Total Reserves of Depository Institutions 1
Commercial and Industrial Loans 1
Total Consumer Credit Owned and Securitized, Outstanding 1
SP500 1
Eective Federal Funds Rate 0
3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate 0
6-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate 0
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 0
5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 0
1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate 0
Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield 0
Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield 0
Narrow Eective Exchange Rate for United States 1
Canada / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate, Canadian Dollars to One U.S. Dollar 1
Japan / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate, Japanese Yen to One U.S. Dollar 1
Switzerland / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate, Swiss Francs to One U.S. Dollar 1
U.S. / U.K. Foreign Exchange Rate, U.S. Dollars to One British Pound 1
Producer Price Index by Commodity for Final Demand: Personal Consumption Goods 1
Producer Price Index by Commodity for Final Demand: Finished Goods 1
Producer Price Index for All Commodities, Index 1982=100 1
Producer Prices Index: Total Intermediate Goods for the United States 1
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items 1
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Apparel 1
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Transportation 1
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Medical Care 1
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Commodities 1
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Durables 1
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Services 1
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less Food 1
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All items less medical care 1
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All items less shelter 1
Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Construction 1
Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Manufacturing 1
Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory Employees: Goods-Producing 1
Real Narrow Eective Exchange Rate for Switzerland 2
Real Narrow Eective Exchange Rate for Japan 2
Real Narrow Eective Exchange Rate for United Kingdom 2
Real Narrow Eective Exchange Rate for Canada 2
Long-Term Government Bond Yields: 10-year: Main (Including Benchmark) for the UK 0
Long-Term Government Bond Yields: 10-year: Main (Including Benchmark) for Canada 0
CPI less food and energy 1
CPI less energy 1
Crude oil spot price WTI 1
Case-Shiller House price index 1
Notes: The table shows the series contained in the vector Xt of the FAVAR and their transformations. The codes
have the following meaning: 0 = no transformation; 1 = 3-month log dierences; 2 = logs. The transformations are
orientated at Forni and Gambetti (2010).
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Figure C.2: Series in Yt
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Notes: The panels show the series in the vector Yt of the baseline FAVAR, i.e., the estimated factors,
the excess bond premium and the JLN uncertainty index. In addition, it shows the Bloom and the BBD
uncertainty proxy. The shaded areas depict NBER recessions. Details of the series are outlined in section
3.4.
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